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Abstract
How	have	Syrians	discursively	constructed	their	identities	on	the	social	network	Facebook	between	
2011	and	2018?	How	have	various	conflict	parties	used	identity	politics	as	a	means	of	mobilization,	
and	 how	 such	 practices	 had	 deflected	 the	 rightful	 demands?	 Can	 linguistics	 using	 data-evidence	
approach	help	us	better	understand	and	analyse	conflict	and	identify	conflict	resolution	intervention	
points?	
This	research	tries	to	answer	these	questions	amongst	others	 in	a	series	of	attempts	to	show	the	
potentials	of	multidisciplinary	approach	to	conflict	analysis	for	peace	interventions	through	big	data,	
discursive	practices,	history	and	the	power	of	archive.
This	paper	 looks	at	self	and	group	 identity	practices	within	 the	Syrian	conflict	by	 investigating	 the	
notion	of	identity	formation	from	a	data-driven	perspective.	The	data	is	based	on	analysing	published	
institutional	 content	 and	 comments	 by	 ordinary	 citizens	 on	 296	 Syrian	 conflict	 related	 Facebook	
pages	between	February	2011	and	May	2018.	The	analysis	shows	four	main	clusters	of	social	groups	
ideologies	with	certain	overlaps	and	strong	 fragmentation	within	 the	Syrian	 revolution/opposition’s	
cluster.	All	clusters’	institutions	and	members	have	used	different	rhetorical	and	linguistic	devices	in	
representing	their	own	groups’	identities	and	the	other	groups’	ones.	While	the	roots	of	the	conflict	are	
structural	 in	their	nature,	mainly	of	ethnic-religious	 ideational	basis,	 institutional	political	messages	
had	 a	 clear	 role	 in	 triggering	 inflammatory	 discussions	 about	 these	 identity	 dimensions.	 Both	 the	
Syrian	government	and	Islamist	groups	had	relatively	clear	objectives	stemming	from	clear	ideologies	
and	explicit	 communication	models.	Possessing	 the	needed	 resources,	both	have	operated	within	
relatively	formal	structures.	This	entitled	them	to	continue	to	construct	cultural	hegemony	through	
various	practices	and	disseminated	discourses	via	institutions.	Both	the	opposition	and	the	nationalist	
Kurds	lacked	self-sustaining	resources	and	clarity	in	objectives.	This	hindered,	most	of	the	time,	the	
possibilities	of	creating	sustainable	and	legitimate	formal	structures	and	left	both	the	opposition	and	
nationalist	Kurds	without	balanced	institutions	to	formulate	more	publicly	agreeable	ideologies	to	be	
disseminated	 for	wider	 public	 consent,	 representability,	 solidarity	 and	public	 cohesiveness.	Beside	
evidential	 inter-ideological	 identity	politics;	a	more	 intense	and	destructive	 intra-ideological	 identity	
politics	manifested	themselves	within	the	opposition	cluster	resulting	in	increased	fragmentation.	This	
had	deflected	millions	of	Syrians	from	their	rightful	demands	of	liberty	and	equality	and	channelled	
public	 discussions	 and	 interests	 towards	minor	 subjective	 presumptions	 and	multiple	 conflicting	
imagined	identities.	We	concentrated	our	work	on	five	identity	dimensions	that	were	played	through	
identity	 politics	 practised	 in	 the	 Syrian	 conflict.	 Namely,	 religion,	 ethnicity,	 gender,	 socioeconomic	
class,	and	the	geographic	location.	Through	analysed	data,	we	identified	four	major	identity	presenting	
strategies	and	multiple	linguistic	devices.	To	start	the	discussion,	we	propose	a	methodology	and	a	
tool	for	these	studies	addressing	conflict	from	a	discursive	point	of	view.
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1 Introduction
The	paper	aims	to	understand	the	Syrian	conflict	following	a	discursive	approach	by	analysing	the	
online	discursive	construction	of	Syrian	identities	and	identity	politics	in	conflict.	The	objective	is	to	
explore	alternative	perspectives	to	conflict	resolution	in	the	age	of	information	given	the	power	of	
the	internet	in	the	discursive	construction	lieu.	Syrians’	natural	occurring	texts	and	semiotics	on	the	
social	network	Facebook	provide	new	opportunities	to	read	and	understand	the	Syrian	conflict	and	
possibly	resolve	or	mitigate	the	continuously	emerging	risks.	The	ideology-based	enormous	corpus	
of	beliefs	and	emotions	emerged	back	since	2011	and	still	emerging	every	day	constitute	collective	
writing	of	history	process	by	Syrians,	individuals	and	institutions.	
This	paper	is	divided	into	three	parts.	The	first	part	provides	an	overview	of	the	importance	of	col-
lecting	and	archiving	discursive	practices	during	conflict	time	for	discursive	construction	studies.	A	
Foucauldian	and	Gramscian	understanding	is	adopted	here	to	discuss	“discursive	practices”.	At	one	
hand,	Foucauldian	understanding	provides	a	reference	to	power	relations	and	how	power	is	assert-
ed	using	language	(Foucault,	1977).	On	the	other	hand,	a	Gramscian	understanding	explains	how	
language	when	transformed	to	the	mass	public	via	ruling	and	power	classes’	institutions	can	create	
cultural	hegemony	(Gramsci	et	al.,	1992).	This	institutional	consideration	is	crucial	to	the	study	of	
information	and	ideological	dissemination	in	conflict	times.	The	first	part	basically	sets	the	theoret-
ical	foundation	of	the	work	where	it	is	narratively	designed	around	four	main	dimensions	of	under-
standing.	(1)	identity,	social	identity,	and	identity	politics;	(2)	discourse	and	discursive	construction;	
(3)	conflict;	(4)	institutions	&	social	networks.
Part	two	focuses	on	the	methodology.	Understanding	the	corpus	used	for	this	study,	the	sampling	
method,	and	the	tool	which	was	conceptualized	and	created	to	serve	the	research	purposes.
Part	three,	the	analytical	part,	is	premised	on	analysing	collected	data	based	on	a	theoretical	
foundation	presented	in	part	one	and	the	methodology	presented	in	part	two.
2 Theoretical Foundations
2.1 Identity, social identity and Identity politics
2.1.1 Self-Identity 
Beliefs	and	values	contribute,	in	addition	to	other	factors	such	as	gender,	religion,	race,	nationality,	
work,	socio-economic	class,	age,	etc.,	to	the	construction	of	individual	identities.	They	also	serve	
as	markers	of	social	affiliation	and	group	identification.	Identity	crises	emerge	when	individuals	
between	the	ages	13-19	fail	to	achieve	ego	identity	and	encounter	role	confusion.	At	this	age,	
individuals	try	to	answer	questions	such	as	who	am	I?	who	can	I	be?	Through	which	they	start	to	get	
a	clearer	notion	of	social	relations	(Erikson	&	Erikson,	1998).	James	Marcia	who	builds	on	Erikson’s	
work	provides	relevant	importance	to	our	research	on	Syria.	The	four	identity	statuses	he	plots	on	
the	axes	of	‘exploration’	and	‘commitment’	can	help	us	delve	into	a	crucial	layer	of	the	Syrian	socio-
political	culture,	namely	commitments	made	without	exploring	alternatives.	Through	his	work	we	
can	explain	certain	types	of	identity	crisis	Syrians	experienced	at	least	in	the	past	10	years.	These	
identity	crises	were	obvious	in	their	online	discussions	and	were	also	manipulated	by	external	and	
internal	factors.	Existential	crises	emerged	in	many	cases	when	individuals	did	not	know	what	to	do	
as	the	norms,	and	situations	they	are	accustomed	to	had	changed	drastically	
“The	foreclosure	status	is	when	a	commitment	is	made	without	exploring	alternatives.	Often	these	
commitments	are	based	on	parental	ideas	and	beliefs	that	are	accepted	without	question”
This	will	also	help	diagnose	several	discursive	practices	from	a	psychological	point	of	view	and	
relating	to	the	social	emergence	concept.	
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2.1.2	 Group-identification
The	Social	Identity	Theory	(SIT)	explains	individuals’	identification	with	social	groups.	“the	
individual’s	knowledge	that	he/she	belongs	to	certain	social	groups	together	with	some	emotional	
and	value	significance	to	him/her	of	the	group	membership”	(Tajfel	1972a:31).	People	reify	their	
social	identities	through	a	social	comparison	between	their	own	group	and	other	groups.	Social	
comparison	theory	(Festinger,	1957)	explains	why	humans	tend	to	compare	themselves	to	each	
other.	Evaluating	one’s	self-opinion	by	comparing	to	others’	enables	a	better	self-understanding.	
However,	for	a	person	to	reflect	through	such	self-evaluation	process,	they	need	to	have	a	self-
concept	in	the	first	place.	Self-Concept	is	a	collection	of	images	influenced	by	formal	and	informal	
socializing	experiences.	The	longer	the	exposure	to	those	experiences	and	the	more	condensed	and	
richer	they	are,	the	more	rooted	the	self-concept	becomes.	In	that	sense,	we	can	say	self-concept	is	
experience	dependent.	We	can	now	think	about	the	possibility	of	relating	relatively	lengthy	exposure	
to	certain	social	experiences	to	the	concept	of	the	imagined	nation	(Anderson,	1991).	Emotional	and	
sensational	content	disseminated	on	social	media	by	institutions	can	also	contribute	to	implanted	
memories	(Landsberg,	2009)	phenomena.	Implanted	memories	can	then	constitute	new	venues	and	
groups	of	categorizations.	But	this	is	not	to	assume	a	determinist	effect	on	identity	imposed	solely	
through	institutional	practices.	In	fact,	people	themselves	engage	in	self-categorization	processes	
within	groups	they	identify	with	by	showing	distinguishing	features	they	believe	they	have.	Self-
distinction	assumes	exclusively	distancing	oneself	from	the	“other”	who	is	not	“like”	or	“similar”	to	
group	members.	This	also	means	increased	in-group	favouritism	and	draws	less	attention	to	intra-
group	differences.	Still,	intra-group	conflicts	are	likely	to	emerge	in	the	absence	of	formal	structures	
and	clear	objectives.	This,	as	we	will	see,	was	a	distinctive	dynamism	which	groups	within	the	
Syrian	revolution/opposition	ideological	construct	had	created	and	suffered	from.	Through	this	
accentuation	and	attenuation	of	differences	between	groups	and	within	groups	respectively	(Tajfel	
&	Wilkes,	1963)	group	members	perceive	themselves	not	only	as	different	but	also	better	than	the	
others	by	concentrating	on	stereotypical	positive	dimensions.	Those	dimensions	can	be	imaginary,	
and	they	contribute	to	the	imagined	identity	and	imagined	nation.
Now	to	look	at	the	concept	of	“nation	as	an	imagined	community”	in	relation	to	self-perception	let	us	
consider	the	mediation	role	of	discursive	practices.	A	nation	is	a	mental	construct	“it	is	an	imagined	
political	community	-	and	imagined	as	both	inherently	limited	and	sovereign.	it	is	imagined	because	
the	members	of	even	the	smallest	nation	will	never	know	most	of	their	fellow-members,	meet	them,	
or	even	hear	of	them,	yet	in	the	minds	of	each	lives	the	image	of	their	communion.”	(Anderson,	
1991:6).	Imagination	can	initiate	the	fabrication	of	language	and	its	tools.	Accordingly,	one	can	
continue	the	search	for	the	notion	of	a	nation	within	the	discursive	practices	of	its	members.	
This	imagined	political	community	is	fabricated	and	shared	through	inter-discursive	practices	of	
institutions’	figurative	discourses	and	citizens	deliberate	reflections	on	them	where	a	dialect	relation	
can	describe	the	negotiation	processes	of	meanings	making	of	this	imagined	political	community.	
Imagination	as	a	cognitive	process	of	generating	images	and	worlds	in	the	human	mind	without	
immediate	inputs	through	human	senses	is	based	fundamentally	on	choosing	words	that	evoke	
worlds	(Long,	2011).	Words	along	with	their	interpretations	are	continually	acquired	and	updated	
through	social	experiences.		The	extents	to	which	these	words,	and	more	importantly	the	more	
sophisticated	concepts	emerging	from	them,	enjoy	public	consent	can	act	as	barometer	of	social	
cohesiveness.	
2.1.3 Identity politics
Identity	politics	is	an	elusive	and	difficult-to-define	concept	(Bernstein,	2005).	Bernstein	alone	
provides	three	perspectives	to	identity	politics,	namely	the	neo-Marxist	approach,	new	social	
movement	approach,	and	social	constructionist,	postmodernist,	and	post-structuralist	approach	
(Bernstein,	2005).	
In	principle,	identity	politics	refers	to	citizens	taking	political	stands	based	on	perceived	outstanding	
groups’	feature(s)	they	best	identify	with.	Originally,	the	term	is	associated	with	the	advocacy	and	
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movement	of	marginalized	citizens	together	to	respond	to	unfair	and	anti-human	rights	practices.	
But,	identity	politics	as	a	political	campaigning	tool	has	always	been	used	by	the	left	wing	politics	
(Jenkins,	2008).	Some	argued	that	identity	politics	which	were	supposed	to	ensure	inclusion	has	
turned	out	to	be	a	divisive	medium	(AMY,	2018).	Some	even	went	far	to	talk	about	hate	being	at	the	
heart	of	identity	politics	(O’Neill,	2018).	Liberal	(Continetti,	2017)	and	left-wing	(Hobsbawm,	1996)	
critics	questioned	identity	politics	as	not	being	able	to	enhance	the	lives	of	marginalized	minorities	
and	bring	them	the	aspired	social	changes	they	long	for.		
Originally,	identity	politics	suggests	that	marginalized	people	gather	and	form	with	other	people	of	
similar	sentiments	and	thoughts	of	injustice	their	ideological	constructs.	They	gather	into	groups	
they	best	identify	with	based	on	these	mutual	senses	of	marginalizing,	oppression,	and	injustice.	
Once	they	have	constructed	such	groups,	they	get	influenced	by	rhetoric	addressing	them,	but	they	
do	also	engage	in	the	processes	of	influencing	the	rhetoric	through	different	social	experiences	
and	practices,	notably	including	the	discursive	ones.	If	they	did	not	perceive	themselves	oppressed,	
marginalized,	threatened	in	the	first	place,	people	will	not	identify	with	and	categorize	themselves	
into	those	-oppression-based	groups.	
In	the	Syria	context,	for	example,	Syrians	not	only	manifest	their	own	identity	elements	in	their	
public	discussions	but	also	negatively	address	the	identities	of	the	opponents,	“since	every	search	
for	identity	includes	differentiating	oneself	from	what	one	is	not,	identity	politics	is	always	and	
necessarily	a	politics	of	the	creation	of	difference”	(Benhabib,	1997,	p.	28)
A	sense	of	threat	triggers	and/or	amplifies	self-categorization/grouping.	To	release	oppression,	
grouping	displays	itself	through	different	practices	amongst	which	are	discursive	practices.
2.2 Discursive Work
This	analysis	of	identity	construction	through	discursive	practices	attempts	to	identify	linguistic	
strategies	and	devices	used	by	individual	citizens	to	reflect	in	a	participatory	mood	on	messages	
disseminated	on	the	social	network	Facebook	by	Syrian	institutions.	Discourse	analysis	and	corpus	
linguistics	are	used	to	handle	the	complexity	of	this	discursive	analysis	work	(Jørgensen	&	Phillips,	
2002;	Wodak	&	Meyer,	2015).
It	is	a	challenging	task	in	itself	to	lexically	describe	events,	actors,	or	constructs	in	a	complex	
phenomenon	such	as	conflict.	Whose	language	should	the	researcher	use?	For	example,	in	this	
study,	we	can	describe	the	same	actor	as	the	‘Syrian	regime’	or	the	‘Syrian	government’.	While	the	
latter	represents	the	international	and	the	‘Syrian	government’	narratives	but	it	does	not	represent	
the	discourses	of	Syrians	who	oppose	the	Syrian	regime.	In	the	same	sense,	should	we	use	
‘revolution’,	‘crisis’,	‘civil	war’,	‘social	movement’,	‘conflict’,	‘war’,	‘proxy	war’,	‘internationalized	conflict’	
or	‘internationalized	war’	to	describe	events	taking	place	in	Syria	at	the	social,	military,	political,	
economic,	demographic,	and	cultural	levels	since	2011?	Each	of	these	descriptive	terms	signifies	
a	phase	of	the	‘struggle’	but	also	the	narratives	of	a	conflicting	ideology/political	group.	Should	we	
use	a	statement	like	‘the	Syrian	president’	when	he	still	was	not	elected	democratically	in	2000	and	
millions	of	Syrians	reject	his	authority?	When	we	talk	about	Syrians,	do	we	refer	to	those	who	were	
alive	in	2011?	2018?	Or	also	those	who	ended	displaced	internally	and	across	the	border,	at	the	
bottom	of	Mediterranean,	under	barrels	dropped	by	Syrian	regime	army	planes,	under	international	
bombardment,	beheaded	by	terrorists	or	in	prisons	and	detention	centres?	Do	we	still	need	to	call	
them	detainees	after	eight	years	of	detention,	or	maybe	‘hostages’	can	be	a	more	relevant	term	to	
apply	when	they	are	being	used	as	a	negotiation	card	in	political	talks?	When	referring	to	terrorists,	
which	definition	are	we	using?	ISIS,	HTS,	PKK,	and	Hezbollah	are	on	the	list	of	terrorist	groups	by	
many	governments.	Yet	most	of	international	and	regional	media	covering	events	in	Syria	had	
employed	different	agenda	in	the	past	years	when	communicating	news	about	the	four	clusters.	
Whose	narrative	are	we	considering?	the	Syrian	government/regime,	the	Turkish	government,	
nationalist	Kurds,	international	community?	When	we	repeatedly	say	the	international	community,	to	
whom	exactly	are	we	referring?	
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As	one	may	realize,	while	the	main	objective	of	this	study	is	to	understand	conflict	through	
discursively	constructed	identities	it	is	crucial	to	draw	the	reader’s	attention	to	the	importance	of	
remaining	attentive	to	used	language	in	analysing	the	language,	mainly	with	sensitive	subjects	such	
as		conflict.	Criticizing,	challenging,	reconsidering	dominant	narratives	and	what	seems	to	be	taken	
for	granted	discursive	practices	is	an	important	role	of	conflict	analysis.	
2.3 Institutions & Social Networks
Neo-Marxism	suggests	that	discourses	formulated	by	ruling	dominant	groups	and	disseminated	
to	the	public	via	either	voluntarily	affiliated	or	controlled	institutions	contribute	to	constructing	
hegemonic	culture.	Imposed	ideologies	encoded	in	crafted	discourses	and	carried	out	by	institutions	
of	power	contribute	to	influencing	and	shaping	public	opinions,	individual	identities	and	possibly	a	
cultural	hegemony.
However,	these	socialization	processes	take	alternative	forms	in	the	social	networks	and	media	
realm.	First,	both	concepts	of	ruling	dominant	groups	and	powerful	ideologies	port	different	notions.	
With	social	networks,	there	is	the	theoretical	possibility	that	every	citizen	of	this	world	can	broadcast	
in	a	one-to-many	format,	thus	posing	a	radical	challenge	to	the	traditional	notion	of	power.	This	
is	also	noticeable	with	the	possibility	of	collective	many	to	many	broadcasts	whether	via	peers	
influence,	fake	profiles	or	bots.	Second,	there	is	the	nature	of	communication	methods	themselves;	
the	tools,	policies,	regulations	and	processes	managing	those	broadcasting	platforms	and	playing	
a	great	deal	in	influencing	the	shaping	of	public	discussions	and	regulating	individuals’	emotions,	
attitudes	and	behaviours.	
In	Syria,	as	we	will	see	later,	the	impact	of	institutional	content	is	undeniable,	during	the	revolution	
then	conflict	and	war.		Social	networks	were	the	main	source	of	information	to	millions	of	Syrians	
who	were	significantly	influenced	by	the	disseminated	content.	Considering	the	“uses	and	
gratification”	approach	in	studying	shared	content	help	to	shift	to	the	study	of	people.	While	in	this	
case	study	it	will	not	be	in	terms	of	looking	at	people’s	individual	characteristics,	it	will	still	help	to	
study		the	influence	of	institutional	content	through	a	bottom-up	approach	by	investigating	how	
ordinary	citizens	identify	with,	reflect	to,	and	create	content	corresponding	with	their	social	and	
psychological	needs	(Cantril,	1940;	Hovland	et	al.,	1949).
2.3.1	 Facebook’s	political	significance
Social	networks	are	popular.	Communication	on	social	networks	is	generally	characterized	as	being	
easy	to	operate,	exceptionally	low	in	cost,	and	efficient	in	reaching	a	relatively	wide	audience.	In	
2014,	the	middle	year	in	our	studied	corpus	timeline	here,	Facebook	was	the	main	social	media	
with	the	highest	penetration	and	market	share	in	the	Middle	East	(Andras,	2014).	Facebook	is	a	
dynamic	transformation	social	construct	where	realities	get	mediated	and	beliefs	transform	into	
new	constructs.	“Facebook	use	is	motivated	by	two	primary	needs:	(1)	the	need	to	belong	and	(2)	
the	need	for	self-presentation.	Demographic	and	cultural	factors	contribute	to	the	need	of	belonging,	
whereas	neuroticism,	narcissism,	shyness,	self-esteem	and	self-worth	contribute	to	the	need	
for	self-presentation	(Nadkarni	&	Hofmann,	2012).	On	Facebook,	private	traits	and	attributes	are	
predictable	from	digital	records	of	human	behaviour.	As	an	example,	Facebook	can	predict	with	high	
accuracy	how	long	one	will	be	in	a	relationship	(Zolfagharifard,	2014).	When	it	comes	to	identity	
politics,	Facebook	environment	facilitates	these	identity	practices.	Users	immerse	themselves	in	
chambers	of	echo,	seeking	social	group	confirmation	(Snyder	&	Cantor,	1979).
People	like	to	confirm	their	beliefs	by	seeking	and	receiving	confirmatory	content	(Festinger,	1957;	
G.	Lord	et	al.,	1979).	Facebook	algorithms	do	just	that.	The	recommender	systems	push	content	
that	goes	inline	with	user’s	initial	interests,	helping	only	to	confirm	and	enforce	user’s	current	beliefs’	
systems.	The	potentials	to	hear	“other”	points	of	view	in	a	safe	context	are	scarce.	When	there	is	
such	a	minor	possibility,	if	that	point	of	view	is	not	liked	by	the	receiver,	the	potentials	to	respond	
aggressively	are	usually	high	giving	the	nature	of	the	space/network	architecture.			
10       Identity Politics in Syria: War in the digital space and the power of discursive practices
Governments	understand	the	power	of	Facebook.	In	2013,	Facebook	report	showed	over	53,754	
government	requests	for	user	data	worldwide,	the	number	of	requests	for	the	just	first	half	of	2018	
was	almost	doubled	to	103,815.	Facebook	reportedly	said	they	are	challenging	autocratic	practices.	
The	political	significance	of	Facebook	is	undeniable.	Facebook	plays	an	influential	role	in	democratic	
participation,	questioning	hegemonic	culture,	provides	innovative	tools	to	the	narrative	formulation,	
and	opens	new	possibilities	for	identity	conceptualization	and	construction/reconstruction.	However,	
the	potentials	are	not	realized	yet	in	a	holistic	understanding	with	a	sharing	mentality	at	the	heart	of	
Facebook	business	model	itself.	As	an	example,		the	mobility	and	portability	features	worth	further	
applicable	investigation	when	it	comes	to	“paraphragmantic	screen”	which	suggests	that	“porous	
surfaces”	can	enable	both	messages’	senders	and	receivers	to	generate	new	types	of	identities	
(Sáez-Mateu,	2018).
Facebook	has	played	a	vital	role	in	Syrians’	communication	as	of	2011.	The	very	first	calls	for	
revolution	appeared	on	Facebook.	Syrians	used	Facebook	to	organize	their	gatherings,	and	the	
Syrian	government	used	Facebook	to	identify	opponents,	trace,	detain	and	in		many	cases	kill	them.	
In	the	absence	of	reliable	and	balanced	traditional	media	institutions,	most	of	the	conflict	parties	
relied	on	Facebook	to	disseminate	their	crafted	messages	and	formulating	their	own	subjective	
narratives	about	conflict	and	inclusively	the	identities	of	themselves	and	their	opponents.	Civil	
society	organizations	used	Facebook	as	an	advocacy	platform,	ordinary	citizens	extensively	and	
frequently	expressed	themselves	online.	New	modes	of	expression	appeared	amongst	Syrians	for	
the	first	time	in	2011	.	And	given	Syria’s	high-context	culture		(HALL,	1976;	Meyer,	2014),	Facebook	
was	a	perfect	match	medium	for	implicit	communication	practices	and	therefore	decreasing	fact-
checking	and	evidence-based	discussions.	
In	this	study,	a	sample	of	296	Syrian	Facebook	pages	is	used	to	analyse	discursive	practices	
throughout	seven	years	of	the	conflict.	See	appendix	for	the	institutions	pages	covered	in	this	study.
2.4	 Conflict
There	are	several	tools	to	analyse	any	of	the	conflict’s	main	dimensions,	i.e.,	actors/relations,	issues,	
dynamics,	contexts/structure,	causation,	positions/strategies.	As	this	research	is	concerned	with	
identity	politics	in	conflict	times,	it	presupposes	the	existence	of	groups	perceiving	themselves	
and/or	their	demands	as	rightful,	oppressed	and	marginalized.	It	is	also	another	premise	that	such	
groups	are	targeted	via	strategically	crafted	institutional	and	public	figures	messages.	To	understand	
how	this	discursive	conflict	is	taking	place	choosing	a	conflict	analysis	tool	addressing	the	causation	
of	conflict	was	needed.	The	Multi-causal	role	model	was	elected.	However,	it	was	important	to	
first	explore	the	conflict	dynamics	to	better	understand	the	relationship	between	structural	and	
dynamic	factors.	The	conflict	tree	helps	as	an	entry	tool	to	understand	structural	factors.	The	tree	
contextualizes	structural	factors	and	metaphorically	presents	them	in	relation	to	dynamic	and	
manifest	ones.	Working	with	dynamic	factors	involves	understanding	events	taking	place	in	the	
short	term	while	working	with	structural	factors	involve	understanding	long-term	influences.	
In	our	research	we	suggest	that	dynamic	factors	can	be	identified	in,	and	extracted	from	
institutional	messages	such	as	daily	news,	whereas	structural	factors	can	be	spotted	in	citizens’	
daily	discussions	and	they	reveal	identity	dimensions,	profound	beliefs,	personality	development	
and	crisis	amongst	other	notions.	Manifest	factors	represent	topics	citizens	like	to	talk	about	but	
not	their	needs.	This	can	be	confusing	when	doing	conflict	analysis	if	not	properly	interpreted	by	
domain	knowledge	experts	and	a	serious	netnography	work.	Each	array	of	factors	provides	a	clearer	
understanding	of	specific	types	of	discursive	practices.
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2.4.1 Collective memory, Groups & Hegemony
Extensive	literature	addresses	the	processes	by	which	collective	opinions	and	memories	can	be	
influenced	and	possibly	shaped	(Herman	&	Chomsky,	1998;	Lippmann,	1997;	Young,	1992,	1994).
Maurice	Halbwachs	worked	extensively	on	collective	memory,	basing	his	work	on	Emile	Durkheim.	
Collective	memory	provides	another	strong	sense	of	identity	and	unites	group	members,	but	it	can	
also	be	used	to	sustain	hegemonic	power.	An	authoritarian	regime,	for	instance,	might	attempt	to	
force	narratives	of	a	unified	history	(Wodak	et	al.,	2009).
Memories	can	be	implanted	as	well	as	imparted.	Individual	consciousness	can	be	influenced	by	
mass	media	through	‘prosthetic	memories’	(Landsberg,	2009).	Memories	that	inspire	empathy	in	
the	receivers	may	allow	them	to	take	empathetic	actions	that	were	not	possible	before	implanting	
these	memories.	Memories	influence	not	only	our	perceptions	on	current	history	but	also	on	how	
this	history	is	written.	Both	during	and	after	the	conflict,	different	narratives	compete	intensively.	This	
research	identifies	at	least	four	ideological	clusters	that	emerged	in	Syria	since	2011.	
Within	this	perspective,	carefully	and	timely	collected	and	preserved	natural-occurring	material	
on	social	media	allows	to	continuously	visit	and	investigate	the	daily	life	narratives	during	conflict	
times,	and	thus	providing	empirical	evidences	for	conflict	analysis	and	peace	building	efforts.	
Historical	visits	to	such	material	can	be	helpful	to	understand	conflict	dynamics	but	this	seems	
to	be	a	complex	task	given	the	huge	corpus.	A	possible	entry	point	is	through	collections	of	public	
discourses	about	historical	events	where	they	show	translated	perceptions	and	conflicting	points	of	
views	about	those	events	and	narratives	associated	with	them.	
3 Methodology
3.1 Research Questions
How	digital	ethnography	and	linguistics	can	use	big	data	to	leverage	our	understanding	about	
identity	politics	in	conflict	analysis.	Syria	as	a	case	study?
3.2 Approach
This	study	uses	discursive	analysis	to	understand	identity	politics	in	the	Syrian	conflict.	The	
theoretical	basis	of	social	identity	along	with	other	related	domains	of	knowledge	explained	in	
part	one,	helped	frame	the	research	field,	establish	the	foundations,	and	design	the	methodology.	
A	mixed-methods	approach	is	used,	where	methods	and	tools	from	digital	ethnography,	corpus	
linguistics,	historical	discourse	analysis	and	conflict	analysis	are	adopted.	Naturally	occurring	
materials	of	ordinary	citizens	on	Facebook	throughout	more	than	seven	years	were	collected	
to	permit	a	bottom-up	data-evidence	analytical	approach	to	be	designed.	The	main	hypothesis	
formulated	here	is	that	the	rightful	demands	of	Syrians	were	deflected	by	many	factors,	including	
identity	politics	practices	by	conflicting	parties’	instituions.	That	being	said,	this	work	focusses	
on	the	role	institutions	play	at	one	end	in	forming	public	opinions	through	the	dissemination	of	
narratives,	rhetoric,	and	discourses,	and	citizens’	manifestation	of	individual	and	group	identities	
through	deliberate	participation	(Boulianne,	2015)	when	there	is	useable	access	to	the	internet.	
The	orienting	question	was	whether	certain	stories	strategically	disseminated	by	institutions	had	
participated	in	enticing	conflict	by	playing	identity	politics	during	sensitive	times?	If	yes,	then	which	
types	of	stories	were	they?
To	explore	this,	the	content	produced	by	both	institutions	and	ordinary	citizens	needed	to	be	
studied.	But	firstly,	a	directional	understanding	to	what	dimensions	of	identity	were	at	high	stake	
in	these	online	discursive	conflicts	was	needed.	Also,	the	events/occasions	of	conflict	needed	to	
be	identified	and	defined.	Within	that	understanding,	institutional	content	which	generated	higher	
lexical	engagement	by	ordinary	citizens	was	mainly	considered	for	the	purpose	of	this	research.	
Engagement	refers	to	ordinary	citizens	comments	on	published	content.	Visual	symbols	reflecting	
emotional	statuses,	commonly	known	as	emojis,	were	not	considered	for	this	analysis.	Although	
they	were	helpful	for	other	particular	studies	by	the	researcher.		
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3.2.1 Bottom-up discursive practices of citizens through everyday conversations
The	bottom-up	approach	looks	at	comments	generated	by	ordinary	citizens	on	the	social	network	
Facebook	to	better	understand	how	such	discursive	practices	were	played	in	propagating	identity	
elements.	Investigating	comments	in	the	past	eight	years	helps	to	understand	imagined	and	
constructed	worlds	through	the	language	of	ordinary	citizens.
Comments	represent	an	interesting	source	of	information	and	a	possible	window	to	the	“diachronic	
unfolding	of	conflict”	(Lehti	et	al.,	2016).
Through	discursive	interaction	analysis,	the	research	identifies	in-group	vs.	out-group	discursive	
identity	practices	and	how	Syrians	use	several	strategies	and	linguistic	devices	with	different	
ideological	bases	to	express	their	identities.	Institutions,	through	their	published	content,	allow	for	
a	wider	range	of	public	opinions.	This	capacity	to	induce	opinion	expression	is	magnified	during	
sensitive	times	such	as	conflict.	During	such	times	people	commonly	witness	increased	tensions,	
polarization,	and	a	general	lack	of	secure	and	peaceful	spaces	to	debate.	Syrian	conflict	witnessed	
remarkable	shrinking	in	both	digital	and	materialistic	spaces	(Freedomhouse,	2018)	.	However,	
online	expressions	come	with	their	own	communications	models	too,	such	as	the	ability	to	post	
anonymously,	the	absence	of	moderators,	the	alternative	tools	facilitating	virality,	chambers	of	echo	
and	filtration,	automated	organizing	and	topics	framing	through	pre-set	algorithms.	
3.3 The Tool
T-Algorithm	is	the	main	tool	that	was	conceptualized	in	the	first	place	by	the	author	and	materialized	
by	commissioning	three	consecutive	Syrian	programmers	to	allow	for	digital	humanities	studies	
in	MENA.	The	early	version	of	the	tool	was	used	back	in	2013-2014	for	a	research	project	to	obtain	
a	master’s	degree	from	Paris	8	University	by	studying	emerging	online	Syrian	art	after	2011.	
At	that	time,	the	tool	was	called	“Share-Syria”.	While	working	extensively	with	different	types	of	
organizations,	mainly	in	media	and	human	rights	sectors,	the	researcher	continued	to	conceptualize	
and	develop	the	tool’s	potentials	which	is	now	called	T-Algorithm,	and	for	the	corpus	related	to	Syria:	
“T-Algorithm	-	The	Syrian	Corps”.
The	tool	was	used	to	archive	several	Syrian	pages	on	Facebook	representing	institutions	and	
organizations	with	influential	ideologies	explained	under	institution	section	and	listed	in	the	
appendixes.
The	institutions	are	categorized	based	on	their	mandates,	political	tendency,	and	when	they	are	
media	institutions/organizations	they	are	organized	based	on	the	type	of	the	publishing	medium.	
The	tool	allows	researchers,	journalists,	and	lawyers	working	on	human	rights	cases,	to	search	a	
continuously	growing	corpus	of	Syrian	semiotics	produced	on	Facebook	over	the	past	eight	years	
of	struggle.	By	keywords	or	lexicons,	researchers	can	also	create	their	own	lexicons.	One	can	use	
several	lexicons	at	the	same	time	to	narrow	down	their	research	and	better	focus	on	specific	topics.
The	tool	allows	researchers	to	search	content	produced	between	two	points	of	time,	in	published	
stories	themselves,	the	comments	on	them,	or	the	replies	on	those	comments.	Researchers	can	
also	search	by	emotional	engagement	type	or	sharing	patterns.	For	any	searched	material,	first	
results	will	always	show	as	total	numbers	allowing	the	explorer	to	have	a	global	understanding.	
Once	the	researcher	had	selected	the	content	type	to	explore	(story,	comment,	reply	comment	or	
any	combination	of	the	three)	data	will	be	presented	in	a	visual	format.	The	researcher	can	zoom	in	
and	out	by	changing	the	time	frame	brackets	from	the	filters’	menu.	Each	time	unit;	i.e,	year,	month,	
day	will	show	data	points	on	the	graph	when	there	is	data.	The	data	points	are	depicted	as	numbers.	
Once	decided,	the	researcher	can	load	the	text	and	start	exploring	it.	Identified	content	is	highlighted	
in	relevant	colours	to	facilitate	spotting	searched	material	within	a	larger	corpus.	Once	an	inquiry	
has	been	retrieved,	all	relevant	information	is	shown	in	one	place,	that	is:	date	of	published	content,	
source	of	content,	engagement	types	with	content.	Content	appears	in	an	embedded	format	
showing	as	it	appears	in	its	original	space	on	Facebook.	The	content	on	Facebook	can	be	accessed	
from	the	same	window	and	once	selected	by	the	researcher	will	be	displayed	in	a	new	tab	in	the	
same	browser	window.	This	is	crucially	important	to	verify	empirical	data.	
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Although	this	is	an	analysis	finding,	and	also	a	methodological	challenge	which	does	not	necessarily	
best	fit	under	this	paragraph,	but	for	epistemological	reasons,	it	is	important	to	note	at	this	moment	
that	some	data	is	not	available	on	Facebook	anymore.	There	are	several	explanations	such	as	users	
deactivated	accounts,	content	deletion	by	posters	themselves,	deletion	by	the	page	moderators	or	
by	Facebook	itself.	However,	the	good	news	is	that	those	links	are	stored	and	for	critical	cases,	such	
as	crimes,	Facebook	can	be	approached	to	retrieve	the	original	content.	However,	this	note	if	of	
crucial	importance	for	empirical	and	epistemological	reasons.	See	appendix	for	some	illustrations.
3.4 Corpus Design
A	corpus	of	296	Syrian	pages	on	Facebook	was	collected.	The	following	criteria	were	considered	
in	sampling	and	collecting	corpus	materials:	(1)	Language:	Arabic.	The	main	publishing	language	
of	the	page	needed	to	be	the	Arabic	language.	Although	some	pages	publishing	in	Kurdish	were	
collected	but	they	were	not	used	in	this	study.	Also,	there	are	comments	by	ordinary	citizens	in	
English,	Kurdish,	and	other	languages.	Those	were	not	considered	in	the	analysis;	(2)	Mode	of	text:	
written.	Although	other	forms	were	collected	such	as	images,	videos,	links	to	external	or	within-
the-platform	content,	emojis	but	they	were	not	used	in	this	analysis;	(3)	Political	lean:	(regime,	
opposition);	(4)	Mandate:	media,	human	rights,	political	parties,	governmental,	non-governmental,	
research,	education,	gender,	woman;	(5)	Sampling:	convenience,	given	the	limitation	of	resources	
and	Facebook	management	application	requirements;	(6)	Medium:	Facebook;	(7)	Domains	of	texts:	
Conflict	&	Identity.
Content	production	and	distribution	speaking,	all	the	content	was	distributed	via	Facebook.	
Facebook	platform	is	the	medium.	All	studied	corpus	was	contained	in	“pages”	format	not	“groups”	
nor	“personal”	pages’	formats.	From	a	source	of	power	perspective,	content	is	either	published	by	
pages	themselves	or	as	different	types	of	engagement	with	that	content	produced	by	what	looks	like	
ordinary	citizens	profiles	on	Facebook.	It	“looks	like”	because	it	is	difficult	to	verify	the	authenticity	of	
the	identities	of	content	publishers	as	being	the	selves	they	claim	to	be	in	real	life	and/or	the	citizens	
with	the	same	formal	and	legal	names	and	online	presented	identities.		Bots,	people	with	several	
names,	people	claiming	the	identities	of	others,	etc.	are	all	possible	sources	that	cannot	be	identified	
easily.	Although	the	author	had	worked	previously	on	developing	authentication	scale,	but	Facebook	
continuously	for	user	privacy	reasons	shares	less	with	researchers	and	applications	developers	so	
it	is	becoming	harder	for	independent	researchers	to	develop	such	identity	verification	tools.	The	
difficulty	of	verifying	authenticity	depends	to	a	good	extent	on	the	seriousness	and	commitment	and	
cooperation	shown	Facebook	to	address	this	crucial	question	in	digital	spaces	and	lives.	
Collecting	and	structuring	the	corpus	was	not	easy.	We	faced	several	challenges	mentioned	next.	
See	appendix	for	corpus	details.
3.5 Challenges
Challenges	faced	can	be	organized	into	four	main	types.	Linguistic	ones,	that	is	all	challenges	related	
to	language	itself	considering	that	we	have	two	main	types	of	language	here,	Modern	Standard	
Arabic	(MSA)	and	different	versions	of	the	Syrian	Arabic	dialects.	Technical	challenges	in	relation	to	
language,	which	refers	to	a	lack	of	information	technology	tools	related	to	processing	natural	Arabic	
language	in	general	but	absolutely	for	the	purpose	of	this	research,	Syrian	different	dialects	too.	
Technical	challenges	in	relation	to	big	data,	this	refers	to	all	the	challenges	related	to	the	volume	of	
data,	acquiring	methods,	storing	and	retrieval.	And	finally,	challenges	related	to	the	methodology	and	
to	the	complex	research	question	itself.	For	more	elaborative	explanation	about	challenges	check	
appendix.
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3.6 Procedure
 - First,	there	was	the	need	to	delimit	and	identify	the	types	of	conflicting	ideologies	-turned	
out	to	be	four,	neither	exhaustive	nor	self-containing-	and	the	main	identity	dimensions	
subject	to	conflict	-turned	out	to	be	five,	neither	exhaustive	nor	self-containing-.	For	this	
purpose,	the	researcher	investigated	data	based	on	membership	terms	such	as	“us”,	
“them”,	“we”,	“you”,	“they”.	This	had	also	helped	in	identifying	the	main/global	discursive	
strategies	-turned	out	to	be	four,	neither	exhaustive	nor	self-containing-.
 - Created	a	set	of	expert	lexicons	and	templates	of	each	identity	dimension	but	also	for	
some	divisive	discursive	terms.
 - Identified	linguistic	devices	and	other	communicative	strategies	using	the	three	modes	
of	persuasion	for	a	convenient	categorization.	Linked	ordinary	citizens’	identity	discursive	
practices	to	source	messages	published	by	institutions	(elaborated	and	published	in	a	
separate	research	paper).
3.6.1	 Identifying	clusters	of	conflicting	ideologies	&	main	dimensions	of	identity	politics
A	method	to	understand	ideological	clusters	and	identity	dimensions	based	on	citizens	self-
identification	discursive	representation	was	needed.	Referring	to	conflict	analysis	literature	was	
helpful.	As	explained	in	the	theoretical	part	earlier,	group	identification	is	based	on	discursive	
distancing	practices	of	one’s	self	and	own	group	from	other	groups	and	inclusively	their	members.	
To	better	understand	how	the	Syrian	citizens	manifested	their	identification	with	a	group	or	another,	
and	how	they	described	other	groups,	a	mixed	method	was	used	here.	The	method	blends	elements	
from	identity	heuristic	approach	(Van	Dijk,	2006)	and	the	elements	of	conflict	analysis	given	the	
multi-causal	role	model	factors:	membership,	reasons,	target/aims,	relations/actors,	resources,	
channels,	triggers,	catalysts.
Starting	with	the	membership	criterion	(Delanty	et	al.,	2008;	Rychard	&	Mason,	2005),	discourses	
containing	identity	elements	of	we	and	us	vs.	you	and	them	were	investigated.	Other	elements	of	
conflict	analysis	to	better	understand	each	ideological	cluster’s	objectives,	structures,	and	resources	
and	their	sustainability	potentials	were	then	explored	for	a	better	contextualization.
The	membership	criterion	helped	identify	four	main	clusters	of	conflicting	ideologies	and	five	main	
dimensions	of	social	identity	manifestation	in	divisive	manners.
3.6.2 Expert Lexicons: From Strategies to Devices
To	move	from	strategies	to	devices	expert	lexicons	were	generated	derived	from	the	data	extracted	
in	the	previous	step	for	each	identity	dimension:	religion,	ethnicity,	gender,	socio-economic	classes,	
proximity.	
Lexicons	are	good	tools	when	analysing	texts	related	to	a	specific	domain	of	knowledge	and	more	
precisely	when	texts	are	the	product	of	a	known	event	as	is	the	case	here	when	discussing	the	
Syrian	conflict.	We	have	the	texts	related	to	the	conflict	itself	which	help	filter	out	non-conflict	related	
texts.	For	example,	words	such	as	checkpoints,	human	shields,	refugees,	displacement,	destruction,	
detention,	kidnapping,	etc.	do	not	happen	frequently	in	the	daily	speeches	of	ordinary	citizens	
during	the	ordinary	days.	We	can	also	recognize	emerging	vocabulary	with	conflict	significance.	
Look	at	compound	words,	phrases,	and	words	such	as	Green	busses,	Jihad	al-Nikah,	Sabaya	al-
Ata,	Shabieha,	Mundaseen,	etc.	They	port	new	meanings	and	significations	in	the	Syrian	conflict.	
Probabilities	to	find	such	vocabulary	in	other	discourses	even	when	these	discourses	are	about	
conflicts	in	other	zones	are	low.
Occurrences	of	new	terms	that	are	divisive,	or	exclusive,	that	are	related	to	categorizing	and	labelling	
self	and	others	are	helpful	to	identify	groups	and	generate	new	words,	phrases	and	templates.	The	
use	of	big	data	to	understand	historical	discourses	helps	in	longitudinal	studies	not	only	from	a	
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socio-linguistic	perspective	but	also	to	better	understand	how	divisive	terms	have	unfolded	and	
spread.	In	section	three,	the	analysis,	the	emergence	of	certain	divisive,	inclusive,	and	stigmatizing	
terms	were	traced	back	to	represent	some	examples.	Realizing	how	such	terms	had	emerged	in	the	
first	place	helps	in	understanding	the	role	discursive	practices	can	play	when	analysing	conflict	and	
more	particularly	how	conflict	unfolded.	Terms	and	words	such	as	Shabiha/thugs,	Moundaseen/
infiltrators,	Irhabeen/terrorists,	Al	Shaab	Youreed/The	people	want,	and	other	instances	stand	as	
good	examples.		
Traditionally,	the	main	criticism	for	developing	lexicons	as	a	representation	model	for	text	
classification	is	that	it	cannot	consider	semantic	relations.	This	was	not	an	issue	of	concern	to	this	
methodological	approach	which	mixed	quantitative	and	qualitative	methods.	The	aim	here	in	using	
data	is	to	enrich	understanding	about	the	conflict	and	identity	in	a	heuristic	mode	which	can	be	used	
for	future	automation	and	machine	learning	models.	A	main	objective	of	this	research	is	to	identify	
themes	under	each	identity	dimension	as	well	as	the	linguistic	devices	carrying	those	themes	and	
communicating	them	but	not	to	model	topics	under	each	theme.	In	that	sense,	guided	by	a	heuristic	
understanding	(Van	Dijk,	2006)	the	researcher	extracted	knowledge	using	expert	lexicons	with	
several	iterations	which	can	constitute	form	now	on	an	observed	material	for	future	machine	training	
work.	
For	knowledge	extraction,	elaboration,	and	validation	purposes	there	are	several	ways	to	develop	
syntactic	or	semantic	templates	based	on	the	research	objectives.	The	lexicons	and	templates	
helped	filter	out	discourses	not	relevant	to	this	research.	The	dictionaries	were	created	following	
a	basic	procedure.	Five	main	lexicons	for	each	one	of	the	identity	dimensions	were	constructed.	
They	were	enriched	via	three	consecutive	iterations.	The	iteration	process	helped	enrich	lexicons	
and	create	sub-ones	by	considering	most	frequent	collocation	words.	The	lexicons	were	then	used	
as	bridges	of	knowledge	acquisition	moving	from	strategies	to	devices.	Once	devices	have	been	
identified,	new	lexicons	were	created	in	Modern	Standard	Arabic	(MSA)	language	and	Syrian	dialects.	
3.6.3	 Identified	discursive	practices	by	each	ideology	and	by	each	identity	dimension.
After	general	discursive	devices	and	strategies	were	identified	under	each	mode	of	persuasion	they	
were	clustered	by	ideology	and	identity	dimensions	for	alternative	examination.
3.6.4 Linguistic and Literary Devices
Next	step	aimed	to	understand	employed	rhetorical	and	linguistic	devices.	Addressing	various	
linguistic	devices	employed	in	the	discursive	construction	of	national	identities	by	looking	first	at	
the	general	persuasive	methods,	and	then	investigating	the	rhetoric	and	linguistic	devices	used	to	
present	both	in-group	and	out-groups.
As	one	can	see,	this	bottom-up	approach	allows	an	empirical	investigation	on	how	ordinary	Syrian	
citizens	negotiate,	construct,	and	present	their	identities	during	their	online	daily	lives.	The	approach	
allows	us	to	understand	institutional	practices	in	relation	to	ideologies	by	directly	investigating	
Syrians	ideologies	and	emotions.
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4 Analysis
4.1 Institutional discourse & Identity politics
One	week	before	the	commencing	of	the	uprising	in	Syria	back	in	March	2011	the	Syrian	government	
unblocked	Syrians	access	to	Facebook.	Syrians	who	were	accessing	the	network	anyways	through	
changing	proxies	started	to	follow	on	the	news	taking	place	in	their	country	through	their	network	
of	friends.	Two	main	regional	Television	stations	(Qatar	state	backed	Al	Jazeera	and	Saudi	state	
backed	Al	Arabiya)	Al	Manar	and	later	on	Al	Mayadeen	tv	stations	backed	by	Iranian	government,	
BBC	Arabic,	TV5	Arabic,	Syrian	state	TV,	and	Orient	TV	owned	by	a	Syrian	businessman	and	
broadcasting	from	Jordan	with	management	in	UAE	with	no	shared	or	clear	information	about	its	
funding	sources.
Soon	as	of	2011	an	emerged	media	ecosystem	backed	mainly	by	the	European	union,	and	the	states	
departments	of	UK,	France,	and	USA	will	start	mushrooming	into	more	than	400	Syrian	media	outlet	
sources.	That	multiplicity	of	voices	was	needed	and	is	still	needed,	but	unfortunately	it	soon	shrunk	
to	only	a	handful	few	sources	and	eventually	returned	to	state	and	semi	state-controlled	media.	The	
main	media	outlets	at	the	time	of	writing	this	are	few	controlled	mainly	by	Qatari,	Russian,	USA,	EU	
different	states	and	the	Syrian	regime.		
Let	us	start	by	having	a	brief	look	at	the	role	institutions	played	in	the	Syrian	conflict.	Gramsci	
(Gramsci,	1971)	argues	that	dominant	ruling	groups	disseminate	ideologies	and	values	through	
institutions	to	ensure	public	consent.	Institutions	pass	messages	with	the	objective	of	socializing	
whereby	people	become	normalized	into	the	beliefs	and	values	of	the	dominant	social	group.	
During	conflicts	at	a	national	scale,	and	even	an	internationalized	one	such	as	the	Syrian	conflict,	
each	conflicting	party	develops	and	operationalizes	its	own	social	institutions.	While	conflict	adds	
to	the	scarcity	of	resources,	the	digital	age	provides	fortunately	-or	not-	the	possibilities	to	run	
institutions	with	relatively	low	resources.	This	economic	efficiency	brings	with	it	at	least	one	obvious	
fatal	consequence	to	democratic	life,	namely	a	relatively	wide	absence	of	regulations.	The	Syrian	
case	is	not	an	exception,	Facebook	as	an	organic	digital	construct,	provided	the	needed	structures	
to	all	conflicting	parties	to	widely	disseminate	their	messages	however	with	the	absence	of	law	
enforcement	regulations.
The	Syrian	government/regime	and	its	allies	were	way	more	conscious	and	strategically	capable	
of	creating	and	operating	such	social	institutions	and	the	crafted	messages	disseminated	through	
them.	While	the	main	assets	of	revolutionists	were	rightful	demands	and	creativity,	they	lacked	
the	leadership,	formal	structures	and	strategic	communication,	those	which	were	the	main	
assets	of	the	regime.	Islamists	on	the	other	hand	had	strong	brand	equity	and	they	employed	very	
precise,	alternative,	unfamiliar	and	accordingly	eye-catching	viral	audio-visual	narratives.	Those	
narratives	with	the	confirmatory	value	to	audience	assumptions	were	plausible	and	‘shareable’.	
By	disseminating	content	with	virality-potentials,	Islamists	were	indeed	recruiting	advocates	and	
adding	up	to	their	popular	base.	The	regime	relied	on	similar	virality	strategies	by	employing	uniform	
reductionist	narratives.	Nationalist	Kurds	had	the	dramatic	hero	power.	The	fighter	women	against	
terrorists	for	example	were	repeatedly	used	in	the	visual	narratives.
Seeking	dominance,	institutional	messages	provided	the	narrative	of	conflicting	parties	and	kept	
framing	and	reframing	opponents	narratives.	The	deliberate	public	responds	to	those	messages	
demonstrated	speakers’	perceptions	and	positions	towards	communicated	messages	but	also	
manifested	in	many	cases	one	or	more	of	the	speakers’	identity	dimensions.	Those	linguistic	
manifestations	of	identity	dimensions	fed	into	the	identity	politics	processes.	Several	factors	played	
at	the	top-down	institutional	messaging	level.	For	example,	the	time	of	posting	messages,	any	
implicitly	or	explicitly	suggestive	editorial	images,	the	interactivity	of	the	institution,	the	messages	
design	itself	such	as	being	a	call	of	action,	information,	sarcastic,	hate	speech	enticing,	were	some	
of	these	factors.		
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It	is	helpful	in	this	regard	to	realize	how	institutional/catalyst	messages	themselves	were	not	the	
exclusive	triggers	who	enticed	identity	politics	conversations	but	also	speakers’	comments	on	them	
too.	The	inter-speakers’	comments	generated	citizens-to-citizens	conversations.	While	in	few	cases,	
those	horizontal	communications	contributed	to	bringing	inclusivity	atmosphere,	they	had	strong	
impact	on	polarizing	and	super	fragmenting	society	giving	the	absence	of	formal	structures,	clear	
objectives,	and	communication	regulations.	Several	communication	patterns	were	identified	such	as	
that	most	of	the	discursive	conflicts	are	triggered	by	men,	as	well	as	the	tendency	to	rush	and	use	
sexist	terms.
Additionally,	institutions	efforts	towards	mainstreaming	social	cohesiveness	and	inclusivity	by	
publishing	relevant	content	were	usually	met	by	violent	and	aggressive	responses	from	citizens	who	
did	not	agree	with	such	content.	This	brings	up	again	discussions	about	the	changes	of	one-to-many	
communication	models	and	the	proportionally	increased	powers	of	citizens/audience	in	comparison	
to	institutional	powers	within	the	national	power	spectrum.		
Having	reviewed	institutional	messages	that	triggered	heated	public	discussions,	two	main	elements	
were	identified	that	contribute	to	heating	up	aggressive	online	discussions.	The	events	that	trigger	
and	enforce	established	identity	perceptions	and	the	activism	type	and	degree	of	institution’s	
moderation	systems	and	policies	when	moderating	public	discussions.		
If	managed	thoughtfully	by	digital	institutions	in	conflict	times	can	play	significant	role	in	conflict	
mediation.	Here	is	a	handy	account	of	several	occasions	where	self-identity	vs.	the	identity	of	the	
others	get	higher	chances	to	exhibit	themselves:	
• Call	of	action:	Institutions	sometimes	publish	stories	calling	citizens	for	action.	Messages	
such	as	“your	comment	please”	clearly	encourage	audience	to	participate	in	public	
discussions	and	express	their	opinions.	Institutional	messages	carrying	calls	for	‘collective	
help’	usually	trigger	heated	battles	amongst	opponents	caused	by	the	tension	created	
between	satire	and	anger/sorrow.	Example:	Cries	from	besieged	Ghouta.	
• Self-honouring	and	accusation	of	others:	Corruption	and	betrayal	cases
• Nostalgia:	being	reminded	about	and	/or	remembering	the	good	old	days
• Threat:	When	under	direct	and	close	threat	citizens	manifest	the	concept	of	identity	more	
in	their	daily	conversations	than	during	the	ordinary	days.	
• Call	of	action	using	‘honour’	theme.
• Anniversaries	related	to:
• Current	events	taking	place	since	2011
• Contemporary	history	events	perceived	by	many	Syrians	to	have	to	do	with	current	
events	such	as	(Kurds	uprising,	Hafez	Al	Assad	coup,	Hafez	Al	Assad	death,	Bassel	Al	
Assad	death,	Hama	Massacre
• Historical	events	believed	by	many	Syrians	to	have	to	do	with	the	religious	dimension	
of	the	conflict	-	Shiite	and	Sunni	/	Sunni	and	Alawite	/	Sunni	and	Christians,	etc.
• National	and	religious	holidays	and	events	belonging	to	one	group	or	another.	Norouz,	
Christmas	evening,	Eid	Al-Adha,	Eid	Al-Fitr,	Ramadan,	7th	of	April,	17th	of	April,	16th	of	
October,	etc.
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4.2	 Syrians’	Group	Identification
Having	used	the	discursive	expressions	of	“membership”	to	understand	how	individuals	identified	
with	one	ideological	cluster	or	another,	the	following	themes	were	identified:
• Apparent inclusive trans-religion and trans-ethnicity: Usually	using	a	singular	first-person	
pronoun	“I”.	Noting	here	that	most	of	the	time,	this	supposedly	trans-groups	ideologies	
are	not	really	always	truly	absolute.	As	an	example,	calls	to	overcome	hatred	between	
Arabs	and	Kurds,	suggest	at	the	same	time	the	base	of	such	inclusivity	should	be	Islam.	
Obviously,	that	suggestion	already	excludes	other	beliefs’	systems.
• Partial Exclusion, face save inclusion, or inclusivity with conditions: All	of	us	are	Syrians	
except	x.,	where	x	refers	to	ideological	elements	that	do	not	correspond	with	the	speaker’s	
adopted	ones.
• Full exclusion: You	are	not	Syrian(s),	Those	are	not	Syrian(s).	Deciding	on	who	will	deserve	
to	be	called	Syrian	and	who	does	not.
• Feelings of estrangement: This	is	where	a	sense	of	estrangement	is	manifested	explicitly	
and	implicitly.	Expressing	that	through	templates	such	as,	‘this	is	not	the	Syria	we	know	
anymore’,	or	‘we	have	never	had	a	country’,	or	‘I/We	never	felt	like	(a)	citizen(s)’.	
• Generalizing: ‘We	Syrians	are	so	and	so’	and	with	negation	variation:	‘We	Syrians	are	not	
(verbs/adjectives)’	or	also	with	less	emphasis	on	the	national	identity:	‘We	are…’,	‘We	are	not	
...’.
• Self-Victimizing to justify attitude ambiguity: These	templates	show	variations	of	self/
group	presenting	to	avoid	claims	and/or	blames.	Through	such	expressive	material	we	can	
identify	the	degree	to	which	the	speaker	is	seeking	agreeability.	‘We	are	neither	with	this	
party	nor	that,	we	are	the	poor’,	‘who	cares	about	us’,	‘who	listens	to	us!	No	one	listens	to	
us’,	‘what	can	we	do,	nothing	at	the	reach	of	our	hands’,	‘no	one	saw	what	we	saw’.
• Self-Victimizing to justify loss: Here	the	speaker	aims	to	justify	losses.	This	can	take	
different	forms.	If	talking	to	self-group	it	is	in	the	form	of	condolences:	‘We	fought	bravely	
but	the	betrayals	…’.	When	talking	to	the	other	group:	‘You	have	all	the	planet	supporting	you	
to	conquer	women,	elder,	and	children’.	Note	how	men	are	excluded	most	of	the	time	when	
the	talk	is	about	loss.	
• Forced emotions:	like	the	‘we	love	you’	campaign	enforced	by	Assad	government	to	
impose	the	‘love’	emotions	to	Bashar	Al-Assad	amongst	Syrians.	Another	repetitive	
template	is	‘if	you	do	not	feel	that	Syria	is	your	pulse,	love,	honour,	mother,	then	you	are	a	
shame’.
• Citizenship: ‘We	are	citizens’,	‘Syria	is	not	Assad’s	farm’,	‘Syria	is	not	the	property	of	Assad	
family’.	However,	few	talks	can	be	identified	here	when	it	comes	to	discussing	tangible	
objectives	towards	a	secular	civil	society	in	Syria.		
• Synecdoche: Syria	Assad:	We	are	Assad’s	-men/people-	and	similar	templates	when	
portraying	Öcalan	by	Nationalist	Kurds.	
• Pride: Mainly	when	a	positive	story	about	some	“Syrian”	is	published.	‘We	Syrians,	our	head	
is	always	high.	
• Apparatchik: wide	array	of	texts	confirming	following	Assad,	and	dead	historical	
characters.	Being	fanatical	Islamists	or	slavish	adherents/supporters.	Single-minded	zeal	
or	dogmatic	Kurds	or	Arabs.	
• Idealist - Normative - Utopian: Mostly	discourses	of	many	human	rights	workers	and	
intellectuals.	Rarely	culturally	conscious,	or	context	sensitive	norms.	By	doing	this	not	only	
very	few	messages	manage	to	cut	through,	but	a	sense	of	rejection	is	evoked	by	masses	
against	basic	human	right	concepts	and	principles.		
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• Identity Politics: 
Discussions	about	the	following	main	identity	dimensions	were	identified:
• Religion: ‘We	Christians’,	‘we	Armenians’,	‘we	Sunnis’,	‘we	Alawiets’,	‘we	are	a	Muslim	
country’,	‘god	with	us’,	etc.
• Ethnicity: ‘We	Kurds’,	‘We	Arabs’,	‘We	Armenians’,	‘We	Circassian’,	…etc.
• Gender: We	woman,	we	men,	we	Homs’s/Duma’s/…	men..etc.
• Social Economic Class:	We	poor,	we	miserable,	the	damascenes,	etc.		
• Proximity: Youth	of	Ghouta,	women	of	Douma,	Aleppoians,	Damascenes.	Inside	and	
outside	Syria,	refugees	and	displaced.	Refugees	defined	by	hosting	countries.
4.3 Strategies
Through	different	strategies	and	linguistic	devices,	Syrians	practiced	distancing	(this,	that,	these,	
those...etc.),	categorization	(we,	you,	they),	and	polarization	(with	us,	against	us)	in	expressing	
identity	elements	through	the	notions	of	in-group	and	out-group.
The	same	membership	criterion	helped	us	identify	two	main	discursive	strategies	of	self-grouping	
versus	others’	grouping.	Two	sub-strategies	were	also	identified	but	we	will	not	focus	on	them	during	
the	analysis	although	we	will	visit	them	while	citing	certain	examples.	
• The	Positive	self-presentation:	Members	identifying	with	any	of	the	four	clusters	of	
ideologies	have	strong	tendencies	to	position	themselves	and	their	groups’	ideologies,	
purposes,	values,	and	traits	in	a	higher	regard	than	that	of	other	groups.	Several	methods	
and	devices	were	used	to	overstate	positive	characteristics	of	one’s	own	ideological	cluster	
in	general	and	the	smaller	group	within	that	cluster	more	specifically.	Disclaimers	were	
used	frequently	as	a	means	of	face	save	or	impression	management	‘I	am	not	a	racist,	but	
Arabs	are	x’,	where	‘x’	can	refer	to	any	sort	of	racist	descriptions.	Empathy	was	employed	
as	conflict	tool,	conflicting	parties	played	empathy	strings	either	for	face	save	purposes,	or	
to	negatively	generalize	about	others	who	do	not	show	‘similar’	empathy	as	people	with	no	
emotions	or	feelings.	Empathy	was	also	used	to	project	one’s	self	as	funny	or	smart	and	
sometimes	was	instrumentalized	to	lure	others.	Empathy	was	also	played	for	preference	
falsification	as	explained	elaborately	in	the	chapter	about	linguistic	devices	of	this	
research.	Dramatization	was	played	by	usually	employing	combinations	of	hyperboles	and	
metaphors	to	convey	positive	self-images	in	standing	in	the	face	of	outstanding	powers.	
In	fact,	the	examples	are	several,	and	to	give	a	last	one,	consider	‘explanation’.	Explanation	
was	used	as	a	discursive	strategy	to	convey	a	positive	image	of	the	self.	Through	such	
linguistic	moves,	talkers	project	wise,	educated,	and	informed	characteristics	about	
themselves	and	the	group	they	belong	to.
• The	Negative	Other.	presentation:	Members	of	groups	within	each	of	the	four	ideological	
clusters	showed	tendencies	to	downgrade	and	undermine	the	values,	principles,	and	
objectives	of	other	groups.	Several	devices	were	used.
Most	recognizable	ones	were,	Illegality/criminalizing	topos	and	the	portrayal	of	others	as	destroyers	
who	are	breaking	law	and	order	and	who	deserve	severe	punishment.	Explanation	was	used	in	
crafted	messages	to	suggest	others’	weaknesses,	corrupted	roots,	broken	souls	and	thoughts	that	
cannot	be	fixed.	Labelling	them	as	traitors	who	are	linked	to	the	international	conspiracy,	Zionists,	
Wahhabis,	Shiites	and	Persians,	etc.	
Another	used	strategy	was	to	implicitly	spread	doubt	and	distrust	amongst	‘others’	groups’	members	
by	highlighting	their	failures,	sharing	information	about	defections	amongst	them,	and	practicing	
character	assassinations.	Comparison	was	frequently	employed	to	convey	a	negative	position	of	
the	outgroup.	Comparisons	about	living	under	the	rule	of	Assad,	or	PYG,	or	ISIS	were	often	used.	
Other	comparisons	made	between	living	under	Assad	oppression	vs.	Jordanian,	Lebanese	or	Turkish	
government	oppression.
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4.3.1 Two sub-strategies are:
• Negative	self-presentation:	This	was	sort	of	collective-self-humiliation.	Templates	such	as	
‘we	are	+	negative	descriptions’	or	‘we	are	not	+	positive	descriptions’	were	often	used.	It	all	
started	by	stories	disseminated	by	Assad	regime	cluster	stating	that	as	a	underdeveloped	
country,	Syrians	needed	still	a	lot	of	social	and	economic	development	before	reaching	
the	point	of	claiming	their	other	human	rights	such	as	freedom	of	speech	and	liberty.	
This	type	of	strategies	emerged	mainly	from	internalized	oppression	and	multiple	internal	
oppressions	practices	extended	throughout	decades	of	political	repression.	Those	self-
narratives	were	also	used	as	self-punishment	shells	to	avoid	criticism;	both	self	and	others’	
criticism.	For	example,	undermining	Arabs	culture	by	associating	Arabism	to	the	practices	
of	Hezb	Al	Baath	mainly	during	Hafez	Al	Assad’s	and	his	precedent	Bashar’s	era,	or	the	
Arab	reunions’	weak	and	uninfluential	summits.	Or	by	associating	Arabs	to	Saudi	Arabia	
specifically	or	the	Gulf	countries	generally	and	using	pejorative	pretexts	to	describe	both.
• Distancing	oneself	from	the	‘ignorant’	masses.	The	speaker	here	acts	from	utopian	position	
as	a	preacher,	messenger,	the	wise	person	carrying	normative	discourses	projected	and	
imposed	as	sources	of	virtue	and	ultimate	solutions.	This	may	be	regarded	as	the	opposite	
of	the	negative	self-presentation	and	it	is	more	concerned	with	elitism	and	normative	
discourses.	Mainly	noticed	amongst	Syrians	who	enjoyed	certain	privileges	working	with	
international	organizations.	
4.4 Identifying the clusters of Ideologies
The	membership	criterion	from	the	conflict	analysis	literature	helped	understand	how	Syrians	
represent	their	belonging	to	one	ideological	group	and	how	they	perceive	“others”.
Published	stories	by	Syrian	institutions	on	Facebook	normally	receive	comments	from	ordinary	
citizens.	Several	factors	play	in	determining	the	level	of	citizens’	engagement	such	as	stories’	
relevance,	publishing	practices,	fans	base,	advertising,	Facebook	algorithms,	the	medium	used	
to	retrieve	stories,	and	users’	psychosocial	statuses.	For	the	purpose	of	this	research,	comments	
around	group	membership	criterion	were	retrieved.	The	comments	retrieval	prioritization	was	based	
on	comments	enjoying	the	highest	replies.	Replies	on	comments	show	a	horizontal	citizen-to-citizen	
mode	of	communication	rather	than	a	hierarchical	institution-citizen	communication.	This	helps	us	
focus	on	contestation	elements.	
The	membership	criteria	allowed	us	to	identify	four	clusters	of	ideologies.
4.4.1 Four clusters of ideologies
Four	main	clashing	ideologies	during	eight	years	of	the	Syrian	conflict	were	identified.	Government/
Regime,	Opposition/Revolution,	Nationalist	Kurds	and	Islamists.	The	Islamists	ideological	structure	
does	not	refer	to	radical	Islamists	only.	Any	political	ideology	embedding	and	instrumentalizing	
religion	were	considered	under	this	cluster.	
Overall,	the	four	clusters	of	ideologies	struggle	for	hegemonizing	the	society	with	different	degrees	
of	power.	The	struggle	for	hegemony	held	different	imaginations	about	what	each	ideology	aspired	
‘homogeneous’	national	community	should	ideally	be	like.	It	aimed	at	enforcing	‘false	consent’	and	
political	conformity.	This	had	inhibited	a	pluralist	articulation	of	interests	and	differences	of	opinion,	
which	in	turn	had	vital	implications	on	developing	in	any	potentially	working	form	of	democratic	
practices	and	governance.
4.4.2 Legitimization of dominance - Cultural Hegemony
The	Syrian	government/regime	had	articulated	“false	consent”	messages	about	a	homogeneous	
Syrian	nation	to	impose	dominance.	On	the	other	hand,	Islamists	promoted	dominance	based	on	
false	assumption	that	they	know	what	is	good	for	all	Syrians	because	they	are	more	connected	to	a	
divine	unusual	power.
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The	opposition	had	neither	the	structure	nor	the	material	conditions	and	sustainable	resources	
to	seek	dominance.	However,	they	tried	via	alternative	yet	inconsistent	messaging	to	claim	a	
better	imagined	nation	and	portray	stories	about	a	better	future.	Therefore,	much	of	the	discursive	
practices	were	based	on	comparison	moves	by	accusing	“others”	of	choosing	to	live	the	lives	of	
slaves	with	no	dignity.	This	discourse	had	manifested	itself	through	different	messages,	going	from	
extreme	threats	to	punish	those	who	did	not	fight	with	the	free	Syrian	army,	or	who	did	not	support	
the	revolution	at	one	end	to	the	far	extreme	left	of	human	rights	workers	and	organizations	which	
promote	their	own	norms	as	the	sole	source	of	virtue.
The	nationalist	Kurds	launched	the	cultural	hegemony	messaging	system	from	nationalist	rights	
base.		For	them,	anyone	who	does	not	support	Kurds	rights	as	presented	by	the	Nationalists	deserve	
punishment	including	Kurds	themselves.	The	main	discourses	should	be	formulated	around	this	
core	principle	and	any	practices	should	serve	it.	Forced	military	service	and	imposed	Kurdish	
language	as	the	main	language	in	areas	under	their	control	were	some	examples.	
After	a	long	period	of	political	repression,	Syrians	started	finally	to	experience	a	decline	of	
hegemonic	discourse.	As	of	2011,	the	proliferation	of	voices	and	new	modals	of	expression	
managed	to	create	a	power	-although	without	enough	momentum-	to	challenge	dominant	
hegemonic	discursive	practices.	Most	Syrians	did	not	agree	with	the	way	things	were.	Despite	the	
fact	the	Syrian	regime	was	in	great	control	of	the	cultural	hegemony	fabrication,	public	spaces,	
discourses,	institutions,	and	the	needed	resources	that	still	did	not	guarantee	the	continuation	of	
Syrians’	submission.	The	uprising	took	off	in	2011.	It	initially	had	a	good	control	of	the	discourses	
and	their	dissemination	between	March	2011	and	mid-2012.	Initially,	the	Syrian	government/
regime	was	in	a	reactionary	position,	trying	to	contain,	manipulate	and	control	the	immense	growth	
of	alternative	discourses	represented	by	a	country-large	massive	social	progressive	movement.	
However,	despite	this	proliferation,	the	Syrian	opposition	could	not	earn	conscience	and	did	not	
manage	to	render	their	discursive	rightful	demands	into	materialized	realities.	The	rightful	demands	
were	too	abstract	and	never	materialized	in	concrete	objectives.	The	main	objectives	lacked	
specificity,	measurability,	attainability,	relevancy,	and	time	framing	(SMART).	A	very	condensed	
moment	in	terms	of	events,	struggle	and	discourses	in	the	current	Syrian	history	was	the	year	2011.	
There	were	hegemonic	discourses	at	the	oppressive	political	regime	side	and	the	human	rights	
demands	of	the	wider	public	at	another.	It	took	the	Syrian	regime	a	couple	of	months	to	articulate	its	
narrative	and	stick	to	it	for	the	coming	years.	That	consistent	narrative	proved	to	be	a	working	one.	
Not	only	because	it	encapsulated	several	already	globally	well-selling	concepts	but	also	because	the	
oppositions	narratives	lost	the	momentum	soon	due	to	many	reasons	including	but	not	limited	to	
excessive	use	of	power	by	the	regime,	a	lacking	of	vision,	and	a	lacking	of	sustainable	independent	
resource.
We	will	briefly	state	the	discursive	practices	for	the	positive	self-group	identity	presentation	and	
negative	other-group	presentation	under	each	of	the	four	ideological	groups.
4.5 Regime
In	the	first	three	months	of	the	Syrian	revolution,	the	Syrian	regime	labelled	opponents	as	insects,	
traitors	and	quantified	them	as	approximately	just	three	thousands	who	do	not	represent	Syrians.	
Soon,	the	regime	discourses	accused,	Jordan,	Turkey,	Palestinians,	Israelis,	Egypt,	Arab-Persian	gulf	
states,	USA	and	more	countries	and	entire	populations	for	plotting	the	unrests	in	Syria.	The	Syrian	
government/regime	narrative	went	even	further	to	claim	the	social	movement	was	a	‘universal’	
conspiracy.	That	was	not	the	only	too	surrealistic	narrative,	there	were	many	alike.	Assad	president	
himself	emphasized	in	a	televised	interview	that	the	united	nation	is	not	a	credible	institution	
and	when	asked	why	then	he	has	an	ambassador	there,	he	laughed	and	replied	“it	is	a	game	we	
are	playing”.	Those	discursive	strategies	and	sub-strategies	were	transformed	via	institutions	
and	public	figures	to	ordinary	citizens.	When	Syrians	went	out	in	peaceful	protests	in	Damascus	
and	documented	that	via	mobile-phones	filming,	as	journalists	and	camera	people	were	under	
extreme	death-threat	by	the	regime	security	forces	and	snippers,	the	Syrian	television	was	so	fast	
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to	announce	that	people	went	out	to	streets	to	thank	god	for	the	gift	of	rain	and	not	to	protest.	A	
parliament	member	stood	up	during	Assad’s	speech	and	addressed	the	president	by	emphasizing	
his	outstanding	wisdom	that	ruling	Syria	would	not	be	enough	for	him,	and	that	he	should	rule	the	
world.	Assad	regime’s	Mufti,	the	highest	ranked	figure	of	the	religious	authorities	in	Syria,	threatened	
Europe	of	potential	suicides	to	come	if	Europe	decided	to	back	up	the	Syrian	opposition.	Syrian	
opposition	would	hear	extremely	bizarre	suggestions,	threats	and	stories	coming	from	the	regime.	
Like	describing	tens	of	thousands	of	protestors	as	a	dozen	of	protestors	only	or	threatening	in	a	
televised	interview	opposition	figures	of	publicly	sharing	intimate	materials	of	them	that	were	stored	
on	a	memory	stick.
The	narrative	went	through	different	phases,	from	reducing		others’	power	to	magnifying	it	in	an	
attempt	to	exaggerate	threat	and	accordingly	the	powerful	position	in	resisting	it.	And	by	doing	
so,	hijacking	and	appropriating	the	concept	of	resistance	which	is	naturally	the	core	feature	of	
opposition	movement.		
4.5.1 The positive we
The	broad	themes	of	presenting	the	positive	we	inside	this	cluster	were	manifested	in	texts	such	as,	
Bashar	Al	Assad	is	the	leader,	the	wise	and	the	one	capable	of	keeping	Syria	peaceful	and	united.	
The	Syrian	army	is	heroic,	winner	and	is	supported	by	honourable	Syrians	and	God.	Self-victimizing	
is	played	using	different	mechanisms	but	always	with	the	objective	of	presenting	group	acts	as	
heroic	and	by	creating	dramatic	heroes	leading	to	catharsis.	
We	do	still	read	here	examples	of	internalized	oppression	and	multiple	internal	oppression	practices	
to	limit	any	possible	kind	of	critic	initiated	by	members	of	“other”	clusters’	members.	
Comparison	is	used	mainly	through	recalling	historical	events	to	remind	Syrians	how	good	Syria	
was	under	the	ruling	power	of	the	regime.	In	this	cluster,	we	will	recognize	dealing	with	Syria	as	a	
property	with	a	strong	sense	of	ownership.	Two	examples	can	be	cited	in	this	regard.	In	the	first	
one,	we	read	Syrians	telling	“other”	Syrians	“this	is	our	country,	and	this	is	our	president,	if	you	do	not	
like	it	you	can	just	go	away”.	In	the	second	example,	we	will	read	Assad	loyalists	talking	to	besieged	
citizens	and	telling	them	“we	allowed	you	a	passage	out	but	you	did	not	leave	your	homes”.	This	in	
itself	confirms	besieging	civilians	which	is	a	war	crime	in	itself.
The	notion	of	‘homeland’	is	strongly	present	within	this	ideological	cluster	due	to	the	“sacrifices”	
taken	by	many	here	to	secure	and	defend	the	homeland.	Maybe,	therefore	‘homeland’	also	
constitutes	one	of	the	very	few	subjects	of	in-group	criticism	practised	mainly	by	soldiers.	As	a	
clear	example,	we	read	this	soldier	from	the	Syrian	army	talking	with	bitterness	about	not	even	
having	a	room	in	his	own	country.	But	then	there	are	other	topics	of	criticism.	Citizens	talking	about	
betrayal	and	the	death	of	many	soldiers.	Or	talking	about	mixed	feelings	of	anger,	frustration	and	
disappointment	and	helplessness	escalating	sometimes	to	the	point	of	questioning	joining	the	
military	and	considering	it	as	a	stupid	act.	The	bitterness	and	anger	of	seeing	soldiers	attacked	by	
corrupted	authorities	such	as	this	video	of	a	woman	in	Latakia	attacking	a	soldier	because	he	did	
not	allow	her	to	get	on	the	stage	in	a	public	event,	also	constitute	a	main	area	of	criticism.	These	
discursive	self-criticism	practices	constitute	valuable	inventory	because	they	contribute	to	framing	
the	citizenship	concept.	Firstly,	such	practices	were	not	possible	prior	to	2011,	and	surely	not	during	
the	first	two	years	of	the	Syrian	revolution.	Secondly,	they	show	the	new	powers	distribution	and	
mapping	where	military	have	a	louder	and	publicly	accepted	voice	among	this	cluster.	Thirdly,	it	still	
implies	that	criticism	can	be	directed	only	by	Assad	loyalists	cluster	and	not	the	opposition.	This	
also	explains	why	most	of	the	time,	any	critic	is	introduced	or	closed	or	both	by	clear	statement	
confirming	loyalty	to	Assad.	Fourthly,	such	criticism	practices	imply	positive	self-image	by	
suggesting	wider	venues	of	criticism	practices	are	becoming	more	possible	and	available	in	Syria	
under	the	ruling	power	of	Assad.	
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4.5.2 The negative they
The	others	are	labelled	and	categorized	in	different	discursive	strategies,	templates	and	moves.	
Opposing	civilians	had	chosen	to	remain	in	the	besieged	areas	because	they	wanted	to	support	
terrorists.	Civilians	were	granted	safe	exist	but	they	refused	to	leave.	Civilians	are	being	used	by	
terrorists	as	shells	and	so	it	is	not	the	regime/government	forces	who	are	intentionally	killing	
them.	Opponents	are	jihadists,	Wahhabis,	radical	Islamists	and	terrorists.	Opponents	have	chosen	
intentionally	to	be	instrumentalized	by	the	“west”	to	destroy	their	own	country.	Opposition	people	
have	chosen	to	“sell”	their	country	for	a	handful	of	Petro-Dollars.	Those	who	had	left	their	country	are	
betrayals.	The	opposition	needs	to	“wake	up”	and	get	back	to	the	right	track	under	the	leadership	of	
president	Bashar	Al	Assad	and	stop	destroying	the	country.
4.5.3 Top-Down Identity formation
The	top-down	identity	construction	was	played	through	identity	politics	enforced	through	continuous	
messaging	of	downgrading	and	devaluing	the	others.	Faked	conscience	and	social	harmony	were	
translated	by	the	political/military/intelligence	regime	down	the	hierarchical	ruling	model	to	public	
through	different	institutions.		
The	origins	of	many	discourses	pronounced	by	ordinary	citizens	within	the	Syrian	regime’s	cluster	
can	be	traced	back	to	the	speeches	of	the	president	of	Syria	himself	and	several	high-ranked	
regime’s	figures.	A	first	example	of	how	Assad	own	words	had	contributed	to	Syrian	society’s	
extreme	polarization	can	be	found	in	his	first	speech	on	the	31st	of	March	2011	where	he	
categorized	populations	in	groups	and	decided	that	people	are	either	with	his	authority	or	against	it.	
Another	striking	example	can	be	found	in	his	second	public	speech	addressing	Syrians	by	describing	
protestors	as	germs.	By	disseminating	such	concept,	he	created	a	“deductive	architecture”	per	
Bourdieu.	By	turning	citizen	objects	into	germs,	the	un-elected	president	had	initiated	a	discourse	
of	sterilization	and	accordingly	constructing	collective	consciousness	along	with	different	sorts	
of	the	attitudes	and	behaviours	that	we	would	see	emerging	later.	Not	only	had	he	criminalized	
any	opposing	behaviour	-this	was	already	the	case	prior	to	2011-	but	he	declared	them	a	trivial	yet	
unneeded	organs.	
The	president	had	also	described	the	opposition	as	traitors	on	several	occasions.	By	accusing	his	
opponents	of	being	traitors	he	as	the	head	of	the	‘Supreme	Judicial	Council’	was	implicitly	charging	
them	with	the	highest	penalty	decree	in	Syria,	which	is	the	death	penalty.	In	a	collapsing	state	during	
internal	conflict	times,	the	president	discourse	resembled	a	decree	or	at	least	a	verbal	signature	to	
informal	militants	to	proceed	with	‘law’	enforcement	themselves	outside	the	court	or	any	juridical	
framework.	As	a	result,	several	field	executions	were	conducted.	A	pattern	we	continued	to	identify	
several	years	later.	At	this	point,	it	may	be	useful	to	remind	ourselves	how	Assad,	and	the	regime	that	
sustained	his	power,	had	hijacked	the	juridical	authority,	in	that	sense,	he	was	in	a	benefiting	position	
as	the	accuser	and	the	judge	at	the	same	time.
When	we	move	down	the	hierarchy,	we	immediately	start	to	see	more	evidences	of	human	rights	
violations.	The	Syrian	regime	high	ranked	members	declared	potential	suicidal	operations	in	Europe	
if	Europe	politicians	decided	to	support	the	opposition.	They	also	threatened	refugees	to	think	about	
going	back	to	their	own	country	Syria.	Discursive	evidence	of	the	regime	forced	displacement	was	
manifested	clearly	here	as	ostracism.	By	this	generalized	labelling	of	the	opposition	and	refugees	
collectively	as	traitors,	the	regime’s	key	figures	in	media,	military,	diplomacy	and	religious	domains	
could	stigmatize	any	individual	opponent	or	refugee	with	the	same	descriptive	labels.	This	allowed	
then	to	detain,	torture,	kidnap	and	kill	with	what	seemed	to	be	a	dominant	consciousness	of	
being	lawful.	Accusing	the	opposition	collectively	of	being	terrorists	also	helped	to	continue	such	
practices.	We	can	continue	tracing-down	the	upper	authorities’	discursive	practices	and	identify	
replicated	themes	in	the	daily	talks	of	ordinary	citizens.	For	example,	many	ordinary	citizens	in	this	
cluster,	clearly	state	that	besieged	people	would	be	allowed	a	passage	if	they	would	surrender.	
However,	if	they	refused	to	surrender,	then	they	would	be	labelled	as	terrorists	who	deserve	only	to	
be	killed.	Other	extremely	violent	calls	of	actions	such	as	smashing	or	burning	opponents	were	also	
used.				
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4.6 Syrian opposition: Identity Politics and Anomie
The	modals	of	expressions	at	the	Opposition/revolution	side	had	changed	dramatically	during	the	
past	years.	As	the	variables	interfering	and	impacting	the	discourses	production	and	disseminating	
are	multiple	here.	Dynamic	conflict	factors	are	also	more	obvious	in	this	cluster.	During	the	first	
and	second	year	of	the	revolution,	several	modals	of	expression	emerged.	Some	of	them	were	
necessitated	by	the	new	realities,	others	were	merely	creative	acts	of	resistance	and	liberation.
In	“The	tyranny	of	structurelessness”	(Freeman,	1973)	Jo	aka	Joreen	explains	how	groups	without	
formal	discussion	and	decision-making	structure	end	up	controlling	each	other	in	a	divisive	
manner.	When	the	group	does	not	have	a	specific	task	to	accomplish,	group	members	start	trying	
to	control	each	other.	Criticizing	the	personalities	of	other	members	become	a	recognized	and	
dominant	feature	of	group	dynamics.	Instead	of	focusing	group	energy	to	achieving	group’s	goal(s)	
the	resources	are	targeted	to	undermine	others	and	flex	personal	muscles.	Within	this	cluster,	
decision	making	structures,	resources	and	processes	were	almost	absent.	In	identity	politics,	as	
groups’	members	are	usually	identifying	themselves	based	on	repression	experience(s),	usually	
the	possibilities	are	higher	they	had	experienced	malnutrition	self-perception	due	to	outer-world	
perceptions	and	discourses.	This	could	intensify	in-groups	struggle	as	it	multiplies	external	
oppression.
4.6.1 The positive we
Opposition	ideological	cluster	had	excessively	used	self-victimizing	discursive	moves	to	promote	
innocent,	rightful,	ideal	cohesive	group.	Despite	the	fact	there	were	millions	of	victims,	self-
victimizing	has	been	repeatedly	used	as	a	result	of	structural	psychological	reasons	and	dynamic	
traumatic	ones.	It	is	still	worth	mentioning	that	the	term	has	been	mistakenly	used	through	in-proper	
translation	by	Syrian	scholars	and	it	was	recycled	repeatedly.	The	translated	term	in	many	cases	was	
used	unfeasibly	and	in	a	non-educated	manner	when	intentionally	or	non-intentionally	blaming	the	
victims	(Ryan,	2010)	in	many	cases.
Despite	the	fact	there	was	a	consistent	pattern	of	self-idealizing	by	all	conflicting	parties,	
cohesiveness	was	the	least	possibly	understandable	claim	within	this	cluster.	Much	more	than	the	
regime	ideological	cluster,	revolutionists	but	more	political	opposition	ascribed	to	the	discourse	of	
crying	over	spilt	milk.	This	has	been	used	not	only	to	attract	sympathy	and	funding	but	also	to	justify	
self/group	wrongdoings.	Even	though	the	regime	was	earlier	than	the	opposition	in	disseminating	
“fabricated	news”	about	non-true	stories,	the	opposition	had	employed	faked	stories	too	often.	
Most	of	those	were	aiming	at	portraying	opposition	and	revolution	advocates	as	victims.	Soon,	
such	practices	fired	back	and	caused	opposition	severe	loss	in	credibility.	Positive-we	were	also	
manifested	by	discussing	who	is	a	patriot	and	who	is	not,	who	is	revolutionist	and	who	is	not.	
Positioning	revolutionists	most	of	the	time	as	idealists	or	even	angles	and	denying	what	usually	can	
be	regarded	as	expected	psychological	implications	of	conflict,	loss	and	war.	The	concept	of	“time”	
seemed	to	be	an	important	determinant	on	who	is	a	patriot	and	who	is	not.	The	historical	opposition	
figures	who	spent	years	in	detention	considered	themselves	old	knights	and	accordingly	had	the	
higher	hand	in	determining	who	is	revolutionist	and	who	is	not.	The	number	of	months	or	years	in	
Assad	regime	detentions	and	prisons	became	the	main	indicator	of	one’s	patriotism	regardless	of	
the	person’s	background,	values	and	socio-cultural	background.	This	can	constitute	an	interesting	
area	of	study	about	the	hero	concept.	Still	within	the	same	theme	of	discussing	who	is	a	patriot	and	
who	is	not	we	identify	discussions	about	differences	between	those	“on	the	ground”	in	reference	to	
those	who	stayed	in	Syria	and	those	who	left	Syria,	where	presuppositions	are	employed	to	suggest	
a	more	patriotism	of	the	former	than	the	latter.	And	from	this	reductionist	understanding,	the	theme	
of	“on	the	ground”	was	further	narrowed	down	to	represent	only	fighters.	In	that	sense,	non-fighters	
are	considered	as	less	powerful	and	less	brave	and	accordingly	should	have	a	second	saying	when	
it	comes	to	decisions	related	to	the	future	of	Syria.	The	ones	on	the	ground	are	considered	as	the	
sole	redeemers	and	defenders	where	sacrifice	is	calculated	using	only	materialistic	measures.	War	
conditions	and	the	lack	of	basic	resources	as	well	as	scarcity	in	international	humanitarian	aid,	
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institutional	discourses,	mainly	sensational	media	-what	bleeds	leads-,	as	well	as	management	
systems	had	contributed	to	the	distortion	of	the	‘sacrifice’	concept.
Utopianism	was	employed	extensively	by	opposition/revolution	ideological	cluster.	Imagined	perfect	
society	is	communicated	by	making	ordinary	citizens	invasion	the	problems	of	the	current	political	
system.	Discursive	strategies	employing	utopianism	were	mainly	manufactured	by	some	Syrian	civil	
society	organizations.
Those	diversified	and	directive	ideologies	are	few	examples	to	show	how	conflicting	ideologies	
within	the	opposition	same	cluster	started	mushrooming	and	weakened	the	opposition/revolution	
rightful	demands	within	the	past	years.	
Extreme	multiple	internal	oppressions	and	internalized	oppression	were	self-practised	and	any	
criticism	of	the	positive	self/we	would	be	faced	with	different	group	muting	practices.	Many	
Syrians	at	the	opposition	side	muted	themselves	in	the	past	couple	of	years	and	experienced	spiral	
silence	out	of	self-protection	and	because	their	arguments	were	drained	in	response	to	repetitive	
counterarguments.	The	scarcity	of	resources,	had	accelerated	the	self-censoring	and	self-muting	
practices.	This	spreading	oil-silence	which	was	heavily	controlled	by	the	Petro-Dollar	funding	granted	
a	better	strategic	position	to	Islamists	and	regime	narratives	alike.	
4.6.2 The negative they
The	regime	is	described	as	a	traitor	who	“sold”	Syria.	Citizens	identifying	themselves	with	the	regime	
ideological	cluster	are	described	as	cowered,	grey	people/with	no	attitude	or	position	towards	
human	rights	atrocities,	and	most	of	the	time	they	are	taking	the	regime	position	for	religious	
reasons	only.	Those	people	are	always	positioned	as	the	‘others’	who	need	to	be	punished	severely	
-when-	the	revolution	will	make	the	ultimate	victory	or	by	god	when	opposition	lose	battles	or	by	
juridical	systems	‘when	the	moment	of	truth	will	come’	.	Because	the	main	practice	in	presenting	
self	was	self-victimizing,	hyperboles	were	employed	to	convey	an	extremely	strong	opponent.	The	
narrative	would	go:	just	because	the	“whole	world”	is	supporting	‘them’	they	are	winning,	otherwise	
they	would	have	lost	the	battles	easily.	Many	of	these	‘others’	are	described	based	on	history	forging	
narratives	as	monsters	and	weird	creatures,	implying	they	need	to	be	killed.
In	addition	to	the	regime/Syrian	government	and	revolution/opposition	ideological	discursive	
clusters,	the	data	shows	another	two	main	ideological	clusters	of	both	extreme	ethnic	and	religious	
bases.	Both	need	separate	studies.	For	highlighting	purposes,	here	are	some	brief	insights.	Both	
clusters’	main	discussions	focused	on	military	operations.
4.7 Islamists 
As	we	will	see	elaborately	under	the	Religion	identity	dimension,	the	discursive	practices	of	Syrians	
throughout	the	past	8	years	(2011-	May	2018)	and	regardless	of	their	religious	background	
contained	strong	religious	identity	elements.	However,	due	to	counter-terrorism	programs	by	
different	states	and/or	voluntarily	acts	by	citizens,	the	content	disseminated	by	radical	Islamists	
usually	get	deleted	from	social	networks.	This	eliminates	evidences	accessible	by	public	–	which	
a	precedent	in	the	juridical	shift	of	powers	by	keeping	such	crimes-evidences	within	the	control	of	
only	private	and	for	profit	companies-.	It	also	makes	tracing	back	the	sources	of	those	messages	
almost	impossible.	That	said,	giving	the	lack	of	what	can	be	considered	as	institutional	social	media	
messages	by	Islamists	we	suggest	other	resources	when	discussing	this	type	of	disseminated	
discourses,	namely	the	published	written	and	audio-visual	material	by	Islamist	groups.	Therefore,	a	
devoted	study	for	Islamists	discursive	practices	is	recommended.			
4.7.1 The positive we
Islamists	presented	themselves	as	the	power	and	will	of	God	on	earth,	and	therefore	they	
continuously	suggested	they	will	win.	This	cluster	had	witnessed	intense	practices	of	lure	of	
promises	where	the	costs	were	too	high,	mainly	in	souls.	Their	objectives	were	clear,	to	create	a	
state	ruled	by	what	they	claim	as	Sharia.	
26       Identity Politics in Syria: War in the digital space and the power of discursive practices
4.7.2 The negative they
Because	they	hold	the	absolute	truth,	they	accused	their	enemies	of	being	infidels	and	they	enforced	
their	own	system	of	punishments	to	any	disobedience.	They	committed	a	wide	range	of	atrocities	
and	violations.	Islamists	raped,	killed,	beheaded	and	took	sex	hostages.	While	other	conflicting	
groups	had	similar	practices	and	as	cited	in	many	human	rights	organisations’	reports	way	more	
than	the	Islamists’	ones.	However,	they	refused	to	admit	such	violations	while	Islamists	made	sure	
those	atrocities	were	publicly	communicated	maybe	as	a	means	to	terrify	their	enemies.	Islamists	
accused	their	opponents	as	incapable	of	realizing	the	truth	or	what	is	good	for	their	own	selves	
and	threatened	them	if	they	do	not	obey	to	be	killed.	They	destroyed	sculptures	and	historical	
monuments	and	they	aggressed	anyone	who	criticized	their	practices.	Within	certain	areas,	they	
recruited	children	and	they	punished	parents	who	would	not	let	their	children	be	taken	to	participate	
in	the	fights.	Their	opponents	online	endorsed	such	practices.	Radical	Islamists	opponents	
advocated	that	ISIS/ISIL	is	‘remaining	and	expanding’	and	they	attacked	anyone	who	refuses	such	
slogans.	They	also	attacked	moderate	opposition	trained	and	equipped	by	Americans	and	accused	
them	for	being	betrayals.	
4.8 Nationalist Kurds
Nationalist	Kurds	hand	enjoyed	extensive	media	coverage	positioning	them	as	the	fighters	of	
terrorists.	Next,	under	the	section	of	ethnicity	we	will	discuss	several	modals	of	expressions	carrying	
ethnical	identity	elements	in	general	and	Nationalist	Kurdish	in	particular.			
4.8.1 The positive we
Nationalist	Kurds	mainly	presented	themselves	as	the	fighters	of	terrorists	and	fighters	for	an	
independent	state.	They	had	relatively	clear	objectives,	formal	leadership	and	structures,	and	military	
power	supported	by	USA,	Russia	and	European	Union.	Despite	that	fact	they	had	also	some	support	
from	both	the	Free	Syrian	Army	(FSA)	and	Assad	regime	at	certain	times;	however,	they	still	had	
big	fights	against	each	other	during	other	times.	With	this	support,	nationalist	Kurds	managed	
to	control	areas	with	oil	fields.	Those	competencies	in	terms	of	logistical	support	and	resources	
dyed	this	ideological	cluster	discourses	with	a	similar	tone	of	pride	to	those	in	the	Regime/Syrian	
government	cluster.	Israeli	government	statements	about	its	support	to	Kurds	rights	in	Syria	had	
also	provided	that	sense	of	confidence	and	sometimes	arrogance	amongst	nationalist	Kurds	
leaderships	and	citizens	alike.	Women	fighters	were	instrumentalized	and	extensively	presented	in	
the	communicated	messages	in	‘western’	media	and	on	social	media.	Nationalist	Kurds	described	
women	fighting	within	their	militants	positively	and	usually	with	a	poetic	language.		
4.8.2 The negative they
Nationalist	Kurds	positioned	their	opponents	as	radical	Muslims	and	terrorists	and	nationalist	Arabs.	
They	associated	Arabs	with	Saudi	Arabia,	and	they	addressed	them	as	a	collective	group	of	terrorists	
obsessed	only	with	women	and	money.	When	discursively	attacking	their	opponents	-the	Arabs-	
they	used	history	forging	to	provide	a	sense	of	credibility	to	their	generalizing	statements.	Obviously,	
in	conflict	times,	those	statements	were	countered	by	similar	statements	and	history	forging	by	
many	Arabs.	One	can	also	argue	that	they	were	a	countering	such	statements	that	were	initiated	by	
Arab	Nationalists	in	the	first	place.	For	this	reason,	amongst	others	we	suggest	a	separate	study	of	
the	discursive	practices	of	Nationalists	from	different	parties.	Nationalist	Kurds	also	continuously	
reminded	Arabs	that	they	did	not	support	them	in	the	Qamishli	uprising	back	in	2004.	They	attacked	
Shawaya	for	betraying	them.	Using	the	presuppositions	about	Arabs	and	their	relations	to	women,	
they	accused	them	of	that	but	by	using	sexist	language.	In	several	evidence	cases,	they	considered	
their	opponents	as	males	only	and	attacked	‘their’	women,	considering	these	women	as	properties.	
With	such	discursive	practices,	not	only	they	consider	women	as	a	commodity,	but	they	also	
described	them	with	very	sexist	and	violent	words.	This	went	in	a	continuous	vicious	cycle	with	
similar	practices	by	radical	nationalist	Arabs.	
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5 Five identity dimensions examined
Reviewing	ordinary	citizens	discourses	about	their	identities	and	the	‘others’’	identities	shows	the	
following	five	dimensions	that	were	continuously	discussed.	
5.1 Religion
Disputes	based	on	religious	identity	elements	were	the	most	obvious	ones	among	identity	politics	
practices.	Online	discursive	conflicts	took	place	mainly	between	Shiites	and	Alawites	at	one	side	
and	Sunnis	on	the	other.	Eventful	dynamic	factors	communicated	with	different	nuances	of	truth	
by	institutions	belonging	to	all	conflicting	parties	triggered	re-enactments	of	historical	events	of	
religious	significations	and	relatability.	Members	of	conflicting	ideological	clusters	traumatized	
by	aggressive	present	experiences	and	with	no	ambiguously	foreseen	future	were	discursively	
reconstructing	their	identities	based	on	historical	events	to	justify	their	current	history	political	
positions.
The	Syrian	regime	was	the	first	to	strategically	involve	the	religion	dimension	in	the	Syrian	social	
changes	as	of	2011	by	launching	the	campaign	“No	to	sectarianism”.	At	that	time	there	were	still	
no	materialized	manifestation	of	any	sectarian-based	disputes.	The	president	of	Syria	referred	
to	“historical”	religious	anger	semi-implicitly	in	one	of	his	earliest	speeches.	As	explained	earlier,	
sectarianism	and	religion	were	instrumentalized	to	justify	Assad	regime’s	oppressive	practices.	
One	can	-justifiably-	argue	that	sectarianism	has	always	been	there	in	Syria,	although	it	was	muted.	
The	countering	argument	can	also	be	that	this	was	exactly	the	very	reason	why	sectarianism	had	
manifested	itself	aggressively	and	violently	once	state	failure	started	to	take	place.	Had	not	the	
Syrian	regime	muted	public	discussions,	Syrian	citizens	would	have	got	healthier	environment	to	
express	their	different	identities	and	identity	dimensions	and	better	reflected	on	who	they	were.	It	
can	be	also	helpful	to	recall	how	Assad	regime	was	the	first	to	let	regional	radical	Islamic	armed	
powers	into	Syria	through	its	affiliations	with	Hezbollah	and	Iran.	But	that	was	not	enough	to	flame	
the	peaceful	protests,	Assad	regime	also	released	those	identified	by	the	Syrian	regime	itself	to	be	
radical	Muslim	prisoners	as	of	June	2011,	just	three	months	after	the	beginning	of	the	peaceful	
protests.	One	of	them	was	Zahran	Aloush,	who	would	soon	become	the	head	of	what	would	be	
known	as	Jaesh	AL	Islam.	Those	sectarianism	production	practices	had	confirmatory	power	to	
regime’s	narratives.	
Islamists,	through	their	Sunni	and	Shiites	institutions	along	with	public	figures	spread	an	atmosphere	
of	victimization	amongst	their	groups’	members	by	triggering	historical	events,	exaggerating	present	
events	or	completely	faking	stories	of	religious	and	sectarian	basis.		Those	practices	had	enticed	
anger,	a	sense	of	revenge	and	blind	adoption	of	those	institutional	promoted	messages	among	
their	followers.	Hanging	beheaded	citizens	on	the	fences	of	public	squares,	high	quality	filming	
of	collective	killing	practices,	burning	a	Jordanian	pilot	in	a	cage,	distributing	nearly	impossible	to	
verify	terror	news	about	an	archaeologist	they	beheaded,	killing	journalists	and	citizen	journalists	
as	well	as	many	other	practices	of	extremely	violent	atrocities	were	all	inflaming	public	anger	and	
acting	as	a	divisive	power	counter	peace	and	inclusive	citizenship.	Islamic	groups	labelled	any	
kind	of	internal	criticism	as	being	divisive	and	used	the	same	rhetoric	of	Assad’s	authoritarian	
regime	and	‘Islamic	resistance’	about	the	sole	priority	of	fighting	the	enemy	and	nothing	else,	and	
implicitly	suggesting	there	is	one	enemy.	Faked	profiles	on	Facebook	as	well	as	verified	ones	played	
sectarianism	by	disseminating	reminder	texts	about	near	future	crimes	in	Hama	committed	by	
Hafez	Al	Assad’s	regime	as	well	as	the	stories	about	Sunni-Shiites	current	history	conflicts	and	the	
relatively	historically	distant	one.	But	those	historical	events	were	re-contextualized	and	remixed	
as	to	make	them	serve	the	ideological	purposes	of	each	party.	For	example,	when	the	radical	so-
called	Sunnis	communicate	messages	about	Hama	they	tend	to	reframe	the	event	as	if	it	was	a	
brutal	attack	carried	out	by	Alawites	against	Sunnis.	Those	discourses	and	practices	backed	up	the	
regime	narrative	of	imagined	non	manageable	sectarianism.	This	mutual-interest	manufacturing	of	
sectarianism	by	all	parties	was	facilitated	by	social	media	due	to	the	ease	of	spreading	faked	news,	
contagious	emotions,	chambers	of	echo,	unverified	faked	profiles,	Russian	and	Iranian	bots	farms	
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and	projects	respectively,	along	with	the	non-human	rights	conscious	enough	then	algorithms.	But	
those	radical	religious	ideologies	were	not	limited	to	prominent	and	known	ISIS/then/IS	or	Muslim	
Brotherhood,	many	political-Islam	groups	emerged	gradually	and	mushroomed	by	attracting	and	
recruiting	their	own	supporters	where	they	contributed	to	the	hyper	fragmentation	of	the	Syrian	
society	fabric.	
Appropriating	god	as	a	source	of	power	and	credibility	to	win	over	-the	others-	seems	to	be	a	shared	
discursive	pattern	amongst	all	four	ideologies.	Mainly,	Islamists	seems	to	be	engaging	god	in	all	
their	discursive	practices,	using	-him:	for	them-	as	the	source	of	a	hypothetical	delegated	power	
they	enjoy,	accusing	their	opponent	of	not	respecting	god’s	orders,	and	assuring	them	god	will	
manifested	through	Islamists	practices	will	eventually	dominant.	This	discursive	dominance	is	too	
strong,	too	abusive	and	very	intolerant.	It	is	also	difficult	to	be	challenged	via	traditional	discursive	
practices	models	and	their	carrying	media.	On	the	other	hand,	the	Syrian	government/regime’s	
opponents	seem	to	be	appropriating	god	too.	Despite	the	manufactured	consciousness	about	
running	a	secular	state,	the	president	Assad	himself	and	his	wife	Asma	keep	engaging	god	in	their	
battle	against	their	enemies.	In	his	many	speeches	Assad	keeps	using	god	as	an	ally,	his	parliament	
members	interventions	during	his	speeches	to	praise	him	and	his	wise	leadership	do	also	many	
times	involve	god	where	Assad	sometimes	respond	by	applauding	and	endorsing	the	text.	Assad’s	
family	followers	do	the	same.	Soldiers	in	battles	do	the	same.	They	frequently	use	the	word	“god”	
as	a	source	of	power	and	credibility.	An	outstanding	use	of	god	can	be	seen	in	the	discourses	of	
opposition.	In	fact,	as	of	March	2011	the	revolutionists	raised	the	slogan:	“God.	Syria.	Freedom”.	
It	is	outstanding	because	of	the	speed	god	is	being	instrumentalized	to	mobilize	or	to	soothe.	It	
is	outstanding	because	it	reflects	a	critical	interpretation	to	god’s	role	in	daily	life	by	citizens	with	
religious	faith.	Before	battles,	opposition	will	have	noticeably	big	confidence	in	victory	with	the	help	
of	god.	Right	away,	after	any	loss,	god	turns	into	a	good	source	of	grieve	and	refuge.	Before	battles	
we	read	words	such	as	“victory	with	the	will	of	god”,	after	loss	we	read	grievance	and	prays	to	god	
to	take	revenge!	Before	battles,	god	is	a	logistic	supporter,	after	the	loss,	god	is	fully	in	charge	and	is	
pushed	to	the	front	lines	to	take	revenge.
Most	of	the	military	fractions	have	been	radicalized	to	one	degree	or	another	so	that	they	would	
fit	more	or	less	under	Islamists	ideologies	clusters,	but	here	the	discussion	is	also	considering	a	
relatively	big	portion	of	a	supposedly	moderate	Muslims	who	are	supporting	opposition	fighters	and	
not	radical	Islamist	groups.	
The	Nationalist	Kurds	employed	similar	moves	as	the	ones	used	by	the	Syrian	regime	and	
opposition,	albeit	les	frequently	and	with	softer	tomes.	The	discussion	about	religion	and	god	needs	
more	work	than	this	brief	explanation	giving	the	embedded	religion	concept	in	the	Syrian	society.		
In	fact,	the	use	of	god	was	not	limited	to	him/her	as	a	source	of	power,	credibility	and	victory.	In	fact,	
many	members	of	all	ideological	clusters	except	the	Islamists,	had	discursively	attacked	god	for	
several	reasons,	such	as	countering	Islamists	discursive	domination,	as	a	response	to	the	plausible	
story	of	regime	that	opposition	is	a	bunch	of	radical	islamists,	or	merely	to	distinguish	secular	self	
from	the	religious	others.
It	is	worth	noting	here	how	God	is	used	as	THE	sole	problem	solver.	We	have	discussed	earlier	the	
informal	logic	and	analytical	skills	most	of	Syrians	lack	due	to	corrupted	systems	of	knowledge	
which	eventually	not	only	prohibit	sound	judgments	and	argumentation	but	also	push	towards	
seeking	and	taking	radical	choices.	We	can	now	develop	that	understanding	to	better	understand	
why	god	as	a	metaphysical	overwhelming	power	was	frequently	relied	upon	to	solve	difficult	
questions.	The	flag	of	Hezbollah,	with	the	word	‘god’	carrying	a	Kalashnikov,	is	a	striking	example	
of	instrumentalizing	god	as	an	arm.	The	slogan	of	Muslim	brotherhoods	party	in	Egypt	‘Islam	is	
the	solution’	is	another	manifestation.	In	the	same	line,	many	Syrians	discourses	during	-at	least-	
eight	years	confirm	the	role	of	god	as	a	sole	problem	solver	for	many	Syrians	who	lacked	problem-
solving	skills	due	to	knowledge	and	education	oppressive	systems	that	were	imposed	on	them	and	
mainstreamed	over	the	last	fifty	years	of	Assad	family	brutal	ruling	of	the	country.	
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God	seems	to	be	yet	another	scarce	resource	in	this	conflict	that	everyone	seems	to	be	battling	
to	gain	a	bigger	portion	of.	However,	god	was	one,	although	big,	theme	among	other	ones	under	
the	religion	identity	dimension.	In	brief,	we	can	realize	now,	six	main	constructs	of	religious	identity	
presentation	of	self	and	others:
• God’s	role
• Engaging	the	persuasive	power	of	god.	God	is	repeatedly	quoted	as	a	lexical	move	to	
provide	credibility	to	one’s	own	claims.	It	is	also	used	intentionally	or	not	as	a	promise	
to lure people.
• Appropriating	God:	‘God	is	with	us	and	we	will	eventually	win’.	This	template	has	been	
used	extensively	by	all	parties.			
• God	as	a	revenge	taker:	‘God	will	take	revenge	for	us’.	This	is	played	in	parallel	with	
victimization.
• God	is	angry	at	us:	This	is	always	played	as	an	explanation	to	one’s	own	group’s	
failure.	‘It	is	because	we	are	away	from	god	and	do	not	follow	[his]	commands,	we	are	
facing	all	this	pain	and	misery’.	‘God	is	taking	revenge	from	us’.
• God	as	targeted	subject:	insulting	god	is	played	as	a	sincere	manifestation	of	
anger,	or	to	insult	others’	beliefs	by	targeting	their	god.		This	was	also	a	discursive	
move	used	for	self-polishing	and	secular	purification.	Many	Syrians	working	with	
international	human	rights	or	media	organizations,	with	obviously	strict	and	radical	
secular	agendas,	used	this	approach	to	ensure	they	are	agenda-fitting.	This	practice	
is	visited	elaborately	in	our	work	dedicated	to	the	modes	of	persuasion	in	the	Syrian	
conflict.	
• Religion	based	hate	speech.	We	have	discussed	earlier	hate	speech	practices	and	we	have	
emphasized	the	importance	of	a	separate	research	for	this	material.	However,	it	is	worth	
mentioning	that	most	of	hate	speech	practices	are	related	to	religion	and	gender.	We	will	
come	to	the	gender	based	verbal	violence	latter	under	gender	section.	When	we	discuss	
hate	speech	within	the	religious	dimension,	we	note	several	themes	most	of	them	are	
built	onto	false	injected	religious	teaching	and	knowledge.	The	roles	of	dominant	religion	
instituions	and	textbooks	during	Assad	ruling	since	1970	are	undeniable	in	this	regard.	
However,	there	is	also	this	strong	influence	of	embedded	false	religious	teachings	in	
society	by	Ottomans.	
• Victimization:	All	religious	groups	and	sects	in	Syria	played	victimization	insisting	they	
have	been	marginalized	and	violently	targeted	based	on	their	religion/sect.	Although	true	
in	many	cases,	however,	this	polarized,	one	dimensional	description	of	realities	prohibited	
more	feasible	translations,	analysis	and	understandings	of	conflict	realities.	
• History	and	the	re-enactment	of	historical	events
Most	of	the	religious	discussions	refer	to	historical	events	and	historical	labelling.	Salafists,	
Wahhabis,	Shiites,	Sunnis,	Ottoman	empire,	historical	battles	between	Hussain	and	
Mouaweh,	Ottoman	empire	atrocities,	massacre	of	Hama,	and	other	events	are	some	of	
the	main	examples.
Discursive	practices	demonstrating	re-enactment	of	historical	events	were	the	most	
obvious	ones	and	they	were	triggered	mainly	by	institutional	messages	communicating	
news	stories	and	the	comments	on	them.	Whether	that	news	was	initially	verified	or	not,	
and	how	this	news	was	edited	and	published	constitute	a	domain	of	interest	and	main	
concerns	to	conflict	analysts	and	professional	media	practitioners.	
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For	example,	we	note	a	peek	in	the	use	of	a	word	such	as	‘Ottoman’	among	Syrians	as	of	
2017	due	to	atrocities	of	Turkish	forces	against	Syrian-Kurds	in	battles	such	as	Ghousn	Al	
Zaytoun,	the	Arabic	words	for	Olive	Branch.	
But	also	more	critically	such	words	with	their	historical	significance	are	triggered	by	
institutional	messages	not	about	any	current	events.	Those	messages	are	about	historical	
events	trying	usually	to	glorify	one	party	or	another	or	to	remind	about	the	crimes	of	one	
party	or	another	such	as	messages	about	Battle	of	Gallipoli	to	glorify	the	Ottomans	or	a	
commemoration	of	the	Armenian	massacres	presented	with	revenge	enticement.		Other	
examples	we	note	when	visualizing	the	data,	are	the	peeks	in	the	use	of	words	related	
to	historical	conflicts	between	Shiites	and	Sunnis	whenever	there	are	events	related	to	
Hezbollah	interventions	in	Syria.
• Disturbed	Islamic	identity	-	Self	presentation
• Associating	Islamic	identity	with	Saudi	Arabia:	This	is	divisive	from	Syrian	Alawites	
and	Shiites	due	to	historical	sensitivity	and	proxy	conflicts	between	Iran	&	Saudi	
Arabia
• Associating	Islamic	identity	with	Turkey:	This	is	divisive	from	Syrian	Armenians,	
Christians,	and	Kurds	due	to	historical	sensitivity
• Disturbed	Islamic	identity	-	Others	negative	presentation
• Associating	the	other	Syrian	with	Turkish	Ottoman	empire,	Saudi	Arabia’s	Wahhabism	
or	Iran	Shiites.	This	is	history	forgery	and	divisive	speech.
5.2 Ethnicity
Ethnic	identity	politics	were	mainly	played	by	Kurds	and	Arabs.	Although	we	can	trace	other	
discursive	practices	by	other	ethnicities	such	as	Armenians	or	Circassians	but	those	were	fewer	
compared	to	the	Kurds/Arabs	one.	We	can	identity	the	following	main	discursive	practices	in	relation	
to	Arabs/Kurds.
5.2.1 Hate speech: 
• Kurds	practiced	discrimination	based	on	origins	where	for	example	they	would	use	skin	
colour	to	trigger	racist	elements.	Arabs	came	from	Yemen;	they	have	dark	skin	colours	and	
now	that	some	of	them	have	lighter	skin	colours	is	just	because	Arab	women	had	practiced	
sex	with	white	“crusaders”.
• Arabs	practiced	discrimination	based	on	social	economic	class	where	they	described	
Kurds	as	shoe	polishers	in	reference	to	a	period	in	the	Syrian	history	when	the	profession	
was	stereotypically	practiced	by	some	Kurds.		
• Defending	ethnical	rights	but	in	using	gender	based	verbal	violence.	We	will	cover	this	
under	the	gender	section.
5.2.2 Historical forgery
• Arabs	claim	Kurds	were	living	far	away	in	the	mountain	areas	and	were	only	hosted	by	
Arabs	when	they	were	expelled.	Then	they	denied	the	good	hospitality	and	turned	out	to	be	
settlers	and	separators	making	a	fortune	of	the	public	disorder	in	the	past	years	and	the	
support	of	both	American	and	Russian	governments.
• Kurds	claim	the	Syrian	Arabs	came	from	Yemen	and	they	had	never	lived	in	this	land	before	
the	Kurds.	They	accuse	Arabs	of	being	Wahhabis	influenced	by	Saudi	Arabia	and	that	their	
relationship	with	the	Turks	-described	by	Nationalist	Kurds	as	Ottomans-	is	a	masochist	
one. 
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5.2.3 History and the re-enactment of historical events
• Kurds	continuously	remind	Arabs	about	Qamishli	intifada	in	2004	and	how	Arabs	did	not	
support	them
• Arabs	continuously	remind	Kurds	about	their	hidden	separation	tendencies	and	what	they	
did	in	Iraq.
5.2.4 Comparison to Israel
• Arabs	(we	are	always	referring	to	Nationalist	Arabs)	compare	Kurds	to	Israeli	settlers	and	
accuse	Kurds	of	being	supportive	to	Israel.	
• Kurds	(we	are	always	referring	to	Nationalist	Kurds)	claiming	Israel	the	only	democratic	
state	supporting	Kurds	rights	and	they	compare	it	to	non-democratic	Saudi	Arabia	and	
other	Arab	countries	states	in	argumentation	to	defend	establishing	ties	with	Israel	state	
that	is	war	with	Arabs	since	1948.
5.3 Gender
Women	were	used	as	war	objects	in	discursive	practices	and	this	was	also	enforced		had	enforced	
through	divisive	identity	politics.	Women	were	presented	as	complementary	males	accessory	and	
were	used	to	attack	and	insult	opponent	male	speakers	by	attacking	“their”	“properties”	in	cases	
or	their	“honour”	in	others.	Shaming	victims	of	sexual	assaults	or	shaming	others	as	practicing	
voluntary	prostitution	are	amongst	the	main	gender-based	identity	politics	practices	aiming	at	
presenting	the	other’s	identity	as	a	fragile,	dishonourable	and	cheap	ones.	In	that	sense,	continuously	
practicing	shaming	victims	of	sexual	assaults	in	conflict	-	indeed	even	worse-shaming	men	for	
sexual	assaults	women	were	exposed	to.	And	moreover,	such	“shaming”	was	not	addressing	
opponents’	close	female	family	members	such	as	their	wives,	sisters,	girlfriends,	mothers,	etc.,	but	
any	women	assumed	to	belong	to	a	collective	group	such	as	Arabs	or	Kurds,	Pro	regime	loyalists	
or	revolutionists.	These	practices	implicitly	suggested	woman	as	a	collective	property.	Discursively	
speaking,	opposition	discriminatory	public	practices	started	back	in	2011	by	addressing	Bushra	
Al	Assad	and	Asma	Al	Assad	family	members	of	Bashar	Al	Assad	and	Luna	Al	Shibli	a	journalist	
working	in	the	presidential	palace.	However,	the	regime/government	had	already	practiced	such	
violations	by	targeting	pacifist	activists	through	private	messages	at	mid	night	phone	calls	
threatening	to	“rape”	their	sisters	and	mothers.	It	is	also	a	widely	known	story	amongst	Syrians	how	
Assad	regime	forces	had	dealt	with	the	fathers	of	the	children	who	were	arrested	in	Dara	as	early	
as	2011	and	the	insults	to	their	wives/children’s	mothers.	The	regime	rape	practices	in	detention	
centres	back	in	2011-	had	also	inflamed	gender-based	identity	discussions.	This	had	encouraged	
many	women	to	take	bold	steps	to	identify	based	on	their	gender	identity	dimension	and	establish	
organizations	and	institutions	led	by	women.
We	notice	the	use	of	historical	vocabulary	in	a	sexist	context.	The	word	Hareem	is	used	by	regime	
and	nationalist	Kurds	clusters	to	negatively	describe	opponents	by	linking	them	mainly	to	Ottoman	
empire.	
Contradictory	values	systems	are	noticeable	when	people	are	talking	about	their	-supposed-	rights	
by	insulting,	attacking	and	violating	the	opponents	using	gender	based	discursive	violence.		
We	identity	several	types	of	gender	elements	manifestoed	discursively	when	discussing	identity.	
Some	examples	are:
• Comparing	men	to	women	as	a	mean	to	understate	their	power	by	describing	men	who	
escaped	war	battles	as	women	or	worse	as	“hareem”,	suggesting	women	are	weak	and	
coward	creatures.
• A	woman	is	a	commodity:	accusing	opponents	as	“their”	women	are	being	bought	and	sold	
in	refugees’	camps.
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• Muted	woman:	women	are	pushed	out	of	online	public	space	discussions:	Violently	
attacking	women	who	try	to	participate	in	public	discussions	and/or	contribute	counter	
points	of	views	by	labelling	them	as	prostitutes.	Even	worse,	claiming	prostitutes	do	not	
have	the	right	to	express	their	opinions.
• Reversal	role:	sometimes	speakers	would	even	accuse	stubborn	and	“brave”	women	
who	continue	to	discuss	publicly	despite	being	exposed	to	“attacks”.	Women	are	blamed	
and	shamed	for	continuing	the	discussion	despite	they	were	insulted	and	attacked	
and	aggressed.	Such	comments	might	go	extremely	further	to	ask	women	if	they	are	
‘continuing	the	discussion	because	they	are	glad	to	listen	to	sexual	insults’.
• The	concept	of	honour	was	extremely	used.	Honour	is	firmly	attached	to	the	sexual	lives	of	
women.	
• Most	of	discussions	involving	sexist	language	take	place	amongst	males.	And	in	many	
cases	female	voice	mediates	heated	discussion	between	males.	The	moderation	
mechanism	most	of	the	time	employ	reminder	moves	about	how	Syrians	were	one	family	
and	“brothers”	despite	the	international	manipulation	and	conspiracy	theory.	Here	we	note	
repetitive	linguistic	normative	moves.
• Woman	practicing	violence	against	women:	Although	rare	but	we	also	notice	several	
examples	of	women	being	verbally	aggressive	against	other	women.	As	the	sample	
example	of	“woman	as	a	commodity”	above.
• Contradictions:
• Examples	of	public	figures	with	verified	accounts	accusing	opponents	of	being	
Wahhabis	while	still	have	no	problem	describing	women	as	Hareem.
• It	is	of	interest	to	understand	how	“god”	frequently	fits	in	the	same	sentence	with	
violent	wording	aggressing	women	(Islamists	cluster	more	than	the	others).
• Using	gender	based	verbal	violence	when	calling	for	one’s	own	rights	(Nationalist	
Kurds,	Regime,	and	opposition	clusters).
Most	of	the	time	sexist	language	escalates	during	violent	events	taking	place	on	the	ground	such	as	
brutalities	in	Efrin	or	Duma.
5.4 Social Economic Class
Like	god,	money	is	a	very	debatable	and	conflict-generating	topic	due	to	its	scarcity.
Several	models	of	expressions	were	identified	under	the	social	economic	identity	dimension.	Social	
economic	status	is	inter-linked	to	all	other	identity	dimensions	but	mainly	proximity.	The	internally	
displaced	and	refugee	Syrians	had	to	deal	with	undeniable	economic	and	social	conflict	implications.	
Under	this	identity	dimension	the	following	main	themes	were	identified:
 - Blaming	the	victim:	many	refugees	were	blamed	for	leaving	their	countries
 - Self-victimizing	is	strongly	emphasised	by	relying	on	social	economic	dimension	by	all	
ideological	groups	but	mainly	the	regime	and	the	opposition	clusters	although	in	different	
ways.	While	the	regime	cluster	played	it	with	a	sense	of	pride	and	even	arrogancy,	
opposition	used	the	impoverishment	as	an	added	layer	to	claim	helplessness.	The	regime	
loyalists	had	four	main	reasons	to	approach	impoverishment	with	this	sense	of	denial.	
• Knowing	they	are	making	victories	and	accordingly	loss	becomes	justified.
• Knowing	there	is	a	huge	reserve	of	oil	in	the	coastal	area	and	accordingly	in	the	worst-
case	scenario	the	geo	political	areas	under	their	best	control	are	rich.
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• Not	being	displaced	as	proportionally	as	much	as	the	opposition	members.
• Making	relatively	bigger	gains	through	war	growing	economy	and	all	parallel	clientele-
based	sub-economies.
 - Superiority	is	highlighted	amongst	nationalist	Kurds	who	enjoyed	controlling	oil-rich	
geographic	areas	with	the	needed	support	of	USA,	Russia	and	Israel.	
 - Complains	amongst	loyalist	soldiers	due	to	lacking	of	financial	resources	and	the	spread	of	
corruption.
 - Discussing	corruption	but	still	attacking	those	complaining	about	the	deteriorated	
economic	situation	in	the	country	when	critics	touch	upon	critical	topics	such	as	ruling	
power	advantages.
 - Accusing	citizens	claiming	their	rights	and	reminding	them	how	their	lives	were	-great-	and	
challenging	them	with	questions	such	as	‘what	do	-you-	need	more!?’
 - Satisfaction-masked	passiveness	due	to	life	hardships.	We	would	frequently	here	
statements	like,	“I	just	want	to	raise	up	my	kids”.
 - Attacking	and	accusing	those	who	do	not	take	a	clear	political	position	as	being	self-
interest	cantered	and	selfish.	
 - Falsely	claiming	that	only	the	-poor-	lose	in	conflict	and	accordingly	zeroing	the	loses	
of	everyone	else.	In	a	way	creating	an	environment	of	victimizing	and	self-victimizing	
competition.	
 - Asking	online	readers	to	contribute	daily	prices	of	basic	needs.	Users	generated	content	
(UGC)	acts	as	a	medium	to	collect	information.		
5.5 Proximity
Almost	half	of	the	Syrians	population	(11	million)	have	been	internally	displaced	and	forcibly	
deported	from	their	homes	and	lands	to	become	refugees	in	other	countries.	As	early	as	2011	
detention	and	massacres	by	Assad	regime	constituted	the	main	two	reasons	for	those	waves	of	
materialized	human	rights	violations	and	the	consecutive	demographic	changes.	Despite	the	fact	
the	Syrian	regime	was	the	main	actor	in	forcing	citizens	out	of	their	homes,	all	conflicting	parties	
played	effective	role	in	those	displacements.	Institutions	had	repeatedly	addressed	the	displacement	
and	refugees’	crisis,	and	we	can	trace	undeniable	linguistic	elements	in	the	daily	discourses	of	
Syrian	citizens	about	new	and	continuously	changing	proximity.	We	identified	different	modals	of	
expressions	amongst	refugees	and	displaced	citizens	depending	on	the	area	they	were	forcibly	re-
located	to.	
	Under	this	identity	dimension	we	note	the	following	main	modals	of	expression:
 - Demographic	changes	reflected	through	geographic	movement	constituted	an	important	
umbrella	theme	under	which	many	sub-themes	had	emerged	and	were	reflected	in	the	
daily	conversations.	Seeing	those	demographic	changes	positively,	neutrally	or	negatively	
were	reflected	through	different	linguistic	and	rhetoric	devices	and	moves.	Liberation,	
purification,	occupation,	demographic	engineering,	demographic	war,	etc.	were	example	
terms.		
 - The	internal	displacement	of	millions	of		Syrians,	almost	seven	millions,	has	always	been	
a	main	discussion	topic	among	Syrians.	This	displacement	is	the	result	of	violations	
committed	by	fighting	parties.	Besieged	areas,	massacres	and	deportation	are	key	topics.	
Several	new	vocabularies	emerged	or	carried	new	significations	during	the	conflict	such	
as	green	busses,	yellow	trucks,	safe	passages,	and	so	on	as	the	data	shows.	The	‘Green	
Busses’	were	used	by	regime	forces	to	deport	besieged	Syrians	to	other	areas	in	the	
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country	after	certain	arrangements	were	organized	mainly	by	the	Russian	government.	
The	deal	was	in	a	way	or	another	something	equivalent	to	saving	citizens	lives	in	exchange	
of	taking	their	homes	and	lands.	Besieged	people	agreed	after	several	months	-and	in	
other	noticeable	cases,	years-	of	being	under	siege.	Loyalists	to	Assad	regime	would	use	
the	phrase	‘Green	Busses’	in	discourses	aiming	at	humiliating	opposition	members.	The	
‘Yellow	Trucks’	on	the	other	hand	was	suggested	by	extreme	loyalists	to	Assad	regime	
requesting	uprooting	the	homes	and	people	in	besieged	areas	using	‘yellow	trucks’	instead	
of	giving	those	people	the	chance	to	be	deported	in	‘green	buses’	through	temporary	‘safe	
passages’.	
 - Inside	vs.	outside	Syria:	Refugees	constituted	more	than	six	million	refugees	in	
neighbouring	countries	to	Syria	and	in	other	counties	of	the	world	constitute	almost	the	
third	of	Syrian	population.	Yet,	regime/Syrian	government	loyalists	had	continuously	
accused	refugees	for	leaving	their	country	in	hard	times	and	accordingly	deprive	them	
many	of	their	rights	including	the	right	of	expression	as	well	as	in	many	cases	their	
properties.	This	where	statements	by	the	Syrian	government	such	as	the	invitation	to	
‘return	to	the	lap	of	homeland’	were	initiated,	promoted,	attacked	and	joked	about.	
 - On	the	other	hand,	many	citizens	in	the	opposition	cluster	accuses	loyalists	of	remaining	
in	a	country	with	no	human	rights	and	choosing	the	‘military	boots’	over	‘dignity’	and	
‘freedom’.	
 - Refugees	in	neighbouring	countries	(Lebanon,	Jordan,	Turkey)	were	exposed	to	different	
types	of	discursive	violations	by	members	of	the	hosting	countries.	Those	violations	are	
continuously	discussed	online.	
 - Topics	about	refugees	who	are	committing	violations	in	neighbouring	countries	as	well	
as	in	Europe	do	usually	generate	another	type	of	heated	discussions.	Opposite	to	this	are	
topics	glorifying	refugees	or	showing	their	achievements	whether	faked	or	true	ones.	These	
types	of	topics	do	also	generate	heated	discussions	albeit	with	more	sarcastic	tomes.		
 - Nostalgia	constitutes	a	large	portion	of	Syrians’	daily	narratives.	Remembering	the	good	
old	days,	sharing	photos	and	images	from	childhood	and	youth,	and	tagging	friends	as	a	
call	of	notice.	Cooking	constitute	a	main	blanket	theme	for	such	discussions.	
5.6 Modes of persuasion
Finally,	general	modes	of	persuasion	ethos,	logos,	and	pathos	were	manifested	through	different	
rhetorical	and	linguistic	devices	with	different	degrees	of	expertise	amongst	conflict	parties.	Overall,	
all	conflicting	ideologies	showed	minimal	reliance	on	logos	(appealing	to	audience	and	convincing	
them	through	logical	arguments).	On	the	other	hand,	all	ideological	clusters	demonstrated	stronger	
practices	of	pathos	(appealing	through	emotions).	The	Syrian	regime/	government	seemed	way	
much	better	than	others	in	playing	ethos	(appealing	through	the	credibility	of	the	source),	but	the	
ordinary	citizens	in	this	cluster	did	not	seem	any	better	than	their	fellow	citizens	in	other	clusters	
in	practicing	ethos.	Arguably	one	can	also	suggest	that	Islamists’	conservatism	also	played	on	the	
need	to	repent	for	our	moral	delinquency	by	going	back	to	the	‘original’	teachings	of	Islam.	
This	can	be	marginally	true	except	that	the	regime	had	relied	on	its	own	credibility	not	on	a	borrowed	
one.	Islamists	relied	on	a	borrowed	or,	to	put	it	better,	a	hijacked	one.	In	that	sense	Islamists	opt	to	
luring	promises	as	they	could	not	affirm	their	credibility	through	materialized	actions.	
We	identified	several	literary	devices	that	were	used	throughout	eight	years	of	struggle	by	both	
instituions	and	ordinary	citizens	in	identity	discursive	practices.	We	dedicated	a	separate	thesis	
chapter	for	this	work	and	it	is	published	in	another	paper.	Here	is	short	list	of	the	devices	covered	in	
the	paper.
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• Populism	&	Generalization
• Preference	Falsification
• Presupposition
• Counterfactuals	–	Identity	and	temporality
• Repetition	or	informal	fallacy
• Normalizing	and	Justifying	of	crimes
• Passive	construction
• Metaphors
• Commemoration
• Lure	of	promises
• Hate	speech
• Tragic	hero
• Zoomorphism
• Schadenfreude
6 Conclusion
Big	data	can	be	used	to	analyse	conflicts	and	bring	constructive	insights	about	a	major	conflict	
construct:	identity.	In	this	paper	historical	discursive	analysis	was	used	following	a	data-driven	
approach	to	understand	the	Syrian	conflict	from	identity	politics	perspective.
By	analysing	the	content	of	269	Facebook	pages,	the	research	showed	how	conflicting	ideological	
clusters	had	employed	different	discursive	practices	to	influence	realities	by	reflecting	on	the	
different	identity	dimensions.	Facebook	as	the	main	source	of	information	for	many	Syrians	played	
a	vital	role	in	disseminating	those	discursive	practices.	It	also	provided	new	understandings	to	the	
notion	of	power.	With	the	shrinking	spaces	imposed	by	regimes	of	repression,	ordinary	citizens	went	
to	Facebook	to	express	their	identities	and	to	socialize	with	the	similar	‘others’.	Facebook	provided	
a	space	where	needed	sense	of	security	and	existentialism	during	uncertainty	times	can	possibly	
be	attained.	Power	instituions	disseminated	strategic	messages	that	triggered	ordinary	citizens	
daily	talks	about	conflict,	their	identities	and	political	positions.	The	power	of	institutional	messages	
during	conflict	times	gains	momentum	in	the	digital	spaces.	However,	with	the	absence	of	formal	
structures,	legitimate	leadership	in	many	cases,	democratic	representation	and	monitoring	tools,	
and	other	vital	resources,	the	power	of	freedom	of	expression	dissolved	and	a	cosmetic	online	
democracy	was	created.			
The	data-driven	approach	showed	the	structural	impact	of	traumatic	historical	events	and	the	
triggered	re-enactment	during	conflict	times.	Data	shows	the	role	of	technology	in	entitling	anyone	
to	share	massively	collective	memories	about	historical	events,	even	the	ones	they	have	never	
experienced	first-hand	themselves.	This	power	of	sharing	combined	with	the	impact	of	virality	and	
speed	spreading	of	online	messages	call	for	new	understandings	to	history	writing	in	a	collective	
nonlinear	way.	This	also	shows	the	emergence	of	a	new	power	of	especial	particularity	during	
conflict	times:	the	power	of	archive.
Four	main	clusters	of	ideology	were	discussed	in	this	work,	and	five	identity	dimensions	of	
significance	in	daily	talks	were	identified	and	analysed.	However,	it	would	be	naïve	to	assume	that	
there	are	sharp	cuts	between	those	five	identity	dimensions	just	as	much	as	it	is	would	be	too	
reductionist	to	assume	crystal	clear	cuts	between	the	ideological	clusters	in	the	first	place.	The	
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discursive	practices	carrying	the	different	dimensions	of	identity	are	interlinked.	This	intertextuality	
provides	possibilities	for	further	understanding	to	the	Syrian	identity	changes.
Identities	are	personal,	contextual	and	events	sensitive.	They	get	influenced	and	shaped	by	current	
happenings	as	much	as	by	social,	and	cultural	variables.	It	is	crucial	to	distinguish	between	the	
social	and	cultural	dimensions.	The	implications	of	each	one	of	them	on	identity	presentation	during	
conflict	times	are	different.	
Differences	and	similarities	held	by	social	groups’	members	about	their	selves,	their	groups,	and	
about	others’	identities	are	perceptual.	Identities	carry	differences,	but	also	inclusively,	similarities	
between	members	of	different	ideological	clusters.	Identities	are	continuously	changing.	That	said,	
there	will	always	be	real-time	new	possibilities	for	peace	intervention	and	building	efforts.	This	is	
where	we	see	and	emphasis	the	vital	roles	technology	can	play.
7 Discussion and Recommendations
1. We	have	realized	and	elaborated	extensively	about	memory	role	in	discursive	practices	during	
the	Syrian	conflict.	When	designing	peace	building	interventions,	a	high	priority	needs	to	be	given	
to	the	politics	of	memory	and	traumatic	pasts.	What	to	forget	and	what	to	remember	should	
constitute	vital	questions	in	the	process	of	future	making.	Institutional	messages	play	vital	role	
in	the	process	of	writing	the	future	by	visiting	history	or	by	not	visiting	it.	On	the	other	hand,	
truth	and	justice	need	to	be	considered	as	vital	towards	peace.	Perceptions	about	both	are	often	
linked	to	historical	narratives	and	to	memory	work.	Truth,	and	justice	about	conflicts	perpetrators	
and	victims	ensure	peace.	Neglecting	truth	and	justice	might	only	provide	quick	fixes	and	short-
term	false	security	but	it	will	definitely	waste	long-term	peace	opportunities	(Pelinka,	2009).
2. Moderation:	Institutions	are	responsible.	‘pages’	and	‘groups’	administrators	need	to	play	a	more	
proactive,	peace-oriented	role	in	moderating	comments	-	mainly	hate	speech	content.		There	
is	no	excuse	to	ignore	this.	Not	only	most	of	the	institutions	do	not	take	positive	proactive	
approach	in	moderating	the	themes,	but	they	also	intentionally	entice	anger	and	hate.	Many	
institutions,	particularly	those	were	the	administrators	are	living	in	democratic	counties,	became	
more	conscious	in	the	past	years	of	the	legal	consequences	of	enticing	hate.	However,	many	still	
play	it	in	an	implicit	and/or	indirect	way.	International	Non-governmental	organizations	(INGOs)	
with	communication/media	mandate	need	to	have	a	more	constructive	and	responsible	role	
in	building	and	sustaining	messaging	systems	during	conflict	times	by	allocating	sustainable	
longer-term	funding	to	digital	platforms	with	inclusive	and	engaging	messages	models.	INGOs	
need	to	consider	more	measures	and	key	performance	indicators	to	ensure	a	peace-making	
content	is	disseminated	by	funded	instituions,	as	well	as	proper	moderation	work	is	being	
done.	INGOs	themselves	need	to	consider	more	internal	accountability	and	transparency	when	
evaluating,	initiating	and	approaching	communication	projects	in	conflict	zones.	Identifying	
potential	players	should	not	be	influenced	by	the	same	tribe	mentalities	and	identity	politics	
manipulation	practices	in	conflict	zones	themselves.
3. There	is	plenty	of	potential	in	real	time	peace	intervention	possibilities.	Information	system	need	
to	be	used	to	understand	conflict	in	a	more	real	time	manner.	There	is	little	use	of	studying	hate	
speech	produced	and	published	by	instituions	after	those	institutions	themselves	had	dissolved.	
A	real	time	work	is	needed	to	detect,	identify,	diagnose,	suggest	and	possibly	provide	solutions	
and	track	them	as	early	as	possible.	
4. A	continuous	dilemma	for	hate	speech	resisters	is	how	to	resist	hate	speech	while	at	the	same	
time	not	violating	freedom	of	expression.	In	fact,	technology	in	its	current	status	provides	
solutions	to	lessen	hate	speech.	‘Pages’	administrators	on	Facebook	can	choose	to	automate	
the	process	of	not	exhibiting	‘comments’	containing	certain	terms.	A	list	of	words,	or	a	hate	
speech	dictionary,	can	be	create	in	a	couple	of	clicks	by	the	administrators	which	will	make	
posting	any	comment	containing	such	terms	impossible.	Although	such	technical	tactics	are	not	
expected	to	create	a	radical	change	in	behaviour,	however,	they	can	certainly	reduce	the	chances	
of	creating	disputes.	
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5.	 In	conflict,	designing	alternative	spaces	and	platforms	is	much	needed.	In	the	digital	
transformation	era,	innovation	and	artificial	intelligence	(AI)	are	crucial	when	designing.	New	sets	
of	skills	need	to	be	obtained	and	transferred	to	relevant	parties	to	cope	with	the	new	realities	and	
norms.
6. Group	influence:	Digital	spaces	need	to	show	-voters	and	their	count-	post	voting	and	not	pre	
voting.	Instead	of	showing	the	number	of	‘likes’	and	‘likers’	before	posting	one’s	own	comment	
or	clicking	the	‘like’	Facebook	&	others	can	encourage	a	more	autonomous,	group-influence-free	
culture.
7.	 Artificial	intelligence	-particularly	Visual	Recognition	(VR)	and	Natural	Language	Processing	
(NLP)-	can	be	used	to	better	evaluate	published	content	taking	into	consideration	contextual	
factors.	With	the	needed	linguistic	and	semiotic	domain	expertise,	Neural	Networks	can	be	
deigned	to	create	models	of	evaluation	and	editorials	policies	in	the	digital	spaces.	
8. Algorithms	need	to	place	less	priority	to	echo	chambers	and	more	priority	to	open	space,	
dialogue	and	freedom	of	assembly.	Recommender	systems	need	to	consider	aspired	selves	and	
not	only	the	current	ones.
9.	 Using	information	technology	and	particularly	geographic	information	systems	(GISs)	to	create	
crowd	peace	and	reconstruction	solutions.	
10.	Digital	citizens	verification:	Facebook	and	other	social	media	platforms	provides	fertile	soil	for	
conflict,	hate	speech,	terrorism,	and	more	gloomy	actions.	But	this	is	just	the	sad,	dangerous,	
and	negative	side	of	a	much	bigger	story.	Those	platforms	also	provide	all	the	possibilities	to	
mediate	conflicts.	By	providing	more	authentication	models	in	a	gamifying	style,	the	game	
of	democracy	and	citizenship	will	be	played	more	joyfully	by	everyone.	Verified	digital	space	
citizen	badges	can	be	thoughtfully	designed	by	Facebook	and	other	social	networking	platforms	
as	means	to	control	ideologies	disseminated	hate	speech	by	faked	profile	and	bots	and	also	
to	encourage	citizens	to	be	more	self-conscious	and	responsible	about	their	accumulated	
expressions	towards	their	digital	reputation.
11. Facebook	to	open	up	data	and	help:	as	we	could	see	several	faked	profiles	had	enticed	violent	
actions.	Without	the	help	of	Facebook,	and	naturally,	similar	social	networks,	it	will	be	extremely	
difficult	to	identify	those	people,	get	to	understand	their	behaviour	and	understand	the	patterns	
worked	out.
12. The	influence	of	daily	events	and	their	reporting	by	institutions	during	conflict	on	daily	life	
discourses	was	obvious	in	this	study.	The	complexity	of	events	and	their	enormous	number	
encouraged	developing	a	data	aggregation	methodology	to	collect	events	and	extract	entities.	
We	have	used	a	hybrid	approach	of	Wikification	along	with	artificial	intelligence	from	Microsoft	
cloud	services	supported	with	expert	lexicons	developed	in	this	research.	This	can	also	help	to	
make	a	better	use	of	commemoration	as	potential	intervention	conflict	resolution	medium.	The	
work	can	be	considered	by	other	researchers	for	further	development.		
13. While	we	have	focused	in	this	study	on	divisive	discursive	practices,	a	devoted	work	to	examine	
inclusive	discursive	practices	is	needed.	We	still	can	briefly	state	here	that	women	played	vital	
role	in	discursive	disputes	mediations.	Despite	the	fact	that	most	the	time	women	are	blocked	
and	attacked	by	men	whenever	they	contribute	a	challenging	texts	to	the	normative	ones,	
women	still	had	times	to	act	as	conflict	mediators	by	mainly	reminding	about	the	old	good	days	
and	how	all	Syrians	should	consider	themselves	as	one	nation	regardless	of	gender,	ethnicity,	
and	religion.	There	are	several	modals	of	expressions	falling	under	inclusive	discursive	practices	
that	can	be	considered	for	future	work	on	dispute	such	as:	Talks	about	food,	football,	success	
stories	of	Syrians	abroad	and	stories	depicting	the	losses	of	all	parties	because	of	violations	
committed	by	everyone	are	just	few	examples.	Such	messages	can	play	to	release	tension,	bring	
conflicting	parties	closer	and	help	Syrians	relate	to	and	identity	with	a	more	inclusive	identity.	
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14. Careful	attention	was	given	to	non-engaging	content.	For	future	work	this	can	show	what	was	
not	interesting	to	Syrian	ordinary	citizens	and	possibly	why.	This	also	highlights	the	problems	
related	to	creating	inclusive	content	during	sensitive	conflict	times	and	suggest	ways	to	properly	
design	engaging	inclusive	content	to	possibly	mitigate	conflict	risks.
15.	Eight	studies	are	needed	to	better	contextualize	and	understand	the	Syrian	conflict	and	possibly	
generalize	for	other	conflict	zones:	
 a Two	studies	addressing	the	daily	talks	of	ordinary	citizens	and	institutional	messages	
disseminated	by	Nationalist	Kurds,	and	Islamists	clusters	are	needed.	Twitter	need	to	be	
considered	as	another	medium	when	addressing	Islamists	discourses.	
 b Refuges	discourses	and	ideologies	by	proximity.	
 c The	west	in	Syria.	Understanding	Syrians	perceptions	towards	the	‘west’.	
 d Syrian	Civil	Society:	Intuitional	strategic	analysis	and	communication	strategies.	
 e Syrian	women	in	the	digital	space:	Challenges	and	potentials.	
 f As	mentioned	above,	inclusive	content	needs	to	be	studied	alone.	This	can	provide	
potential	answers	towards	social	cohesiveness	and	to	what	brings	Syrians	closer?
 g Hate	Speech:	How	hate	messages	unfold	and	spread.	taping	with	a	date	and	geo	location	
sign.
“The	 foreclosure	 status	 is	 when	 a	 commitment	 is	 made	 without	 exploring	 alternatives.	 Often	 these	
commitments	are	based	on	parental	ideas	and	beliefs	that	are	accepted	without	question”
39       Identity Politics in Syria: War in the digital space and the power of discursive practices
8 Bibliography
Donohue, William, Qi Hao, Richard Spreng, and Charles Owen. 2019. ‘Understanding the Role of 
Language in Conflict’. American Behavioral Scientist.
Al Deek, Akram. 2017. Writing Displacement - Home and Identity in Contemporary Post-Colonial 
English Fiction. Palgrave.
Alfonso, Carolin, Waltraud Kokot, and Khachig Tölölyan. 2004. Diaspora, Identity and Religion: New 
Directions in Theory and Research. Routledge.
Ali, Nasreen. 2003. ‘Diaspora and Nation: Displacement and the Politics of Kashmiri Identity in 
Britain’. Contemporary South Asia 12(4):471–80.
AMY, CHUA. 2018. Political Tribes. GROUP INSTINCT AND THE FATE OF NATIONS. Penguin Press.
Anderson, Benedict. 2006. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. Verso.
Anon. 2013. ‘“No Such Thing as Falkland Islanders”, Says Argentine Foreign Minister’. February 6.
Anon. n.d. ‘Drone Attacks Spur Legal Debate On Definition Of “Battlefield” | HuffPost’. Retrieved 10 
October 2019a (https://www.huffpost.com/entry/drone-attacks-legal-debate_n_2687980).
Anon. n.d. ‘Language in Conflict — “Threat” and ’Risk’ — Their Part in the Iraq War’. Retrieved 10 
October 2019b (https://languageinconflict.org/147-threat-and-risk-their-part-in-the-iraq-war.html).
Anon. n.d. ‘Language Log » Mubarak’s Poodle’. Retrieved 13 October 2019c (https://languagelog.
ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=2962).
Anon. n.d. ‘Obama Reframes Syria: Metaphor and War Revisited | HuffPost’. Retrieved 9 October 
2019d (https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-reframes-syria-meta_b_3879335).
Anon. n.d. ‘Why Foucault’s Work on Power Is More Important than Ever – Colin Koopman | Aeon 
Essays’. Aeon. Retrieved 15 June 2020e (https://aeon.co/essays/why-foucaults-work-on-power-is-
more-important-than-ever).
Audi, Robert, ed. 2015. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Bakewell, Sarah. 2013. ‘How We’re Herded by Language | Sarah Bakewell’. The Guardian, September 
6.
Balcells, Laia, and Abbey Steele. 2016. ‘Warfare, Political Identities, and Displacement in Spain and 
Colombia’. Political Geography 51:15–29.
Bamberg, Michael, and Alexandra Georgakopoulou. 2008. ‘Small Stories as a New Perspective in 
Narrative and Identity Analysis’. Text & Talk 28(3):377–396.
BBC. 2019. ‘Why Is There a War in Syria? - BBC News’. BBC. Retrieved 27 September 2019 (https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229).
Benhabib, Seyla. 1997. ‘Strange Multiplicities: The Politics of Identity and Difference in a Global 
Context’. Macalester International 4.
Bernstein, Mary. 2005. ‘Identity Politics’. Annual Review of Sociology 31(1):47–74.
Boulianne, Shelley. 2015. ‘Social Media Use and Participation: A Meta-Analysis of Current 
Research’. Information Communication and Society 18(5):524–38.
40       Identity Politics in Syria: War in the digital space and the power of discursive practices
Bumiller, Elisabeth. 2001. ‘A NATION CHALLENGED: BRITAIN; Bush and Blair Trade Praise At White 
House Love Fest’. The New York Times, November 8.
Burkeman, Oliver. 2013a. ‘The Cheerios Theory of the Syria Strikes, or Why War Metaphors Really 
Matter | Oliver Burkeman’. The Guardian, September 9.
Burkeman, Oliver. 2013b. ‘The Cheerios Theory of the Syria Strikes, or Why War Metaphors Really 
Matter | Oliver Burkeman’. The Guardian, September 9.
Cameron, Deborah. 1985. ‘What Has Gender Got to Do with Sex?’ Language & Communication 
(Journal Article).
Chiluwa, Innocent. 2019. Discourse Analysis and Conflict Studies.
Connaughton, Stacey L., Jasmine R. Linabary, and Liliya Yakova. 2017. ‘Discursive Construction’. 
The International Encyclopedia of Organizational Communication (Generic).
Continetti, Matthew. 2017. ‘The Problem of Identity Politics and Its Solution’. Imprimis 46(11).
Crawford, Mary, and Linda English. 1984. ‘Generic versus Specific Inclusion of Women in Language: 
Effects on Recall’. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research 13(5):373–81.
Daher, Joseph. 2017. ‘Hezbollah, the Lebanese Sectarian State, and Sectarianism’. Middle East 
Institute. Retrieved 21 October 2019 (https://www.mei.edu/publications/hezbollah-lebanese-
sectarian-state-and-sectarianism).
Damaledo, Andrey. 2018. Divided Loyalties: Displacement, Belonging and Citizenship among East 
Timorese in West Timor. ANU Press.
Delanty, Gerard, Ruth Wodak, and Paul Jones, eds. 2008. Identity, Belonging and Migration. 
Liverpool University Press.
Dijk, Teun A. Van. 2015. ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’. 20.
Durrheim, Kevin, Michael Quayle, Colin G. Tredoux, Kim Titlestad, and Larry Tooke. 2016. 
‘Investigating the Evolution of Ingroup Favoritism Using a Minimal Group Interaction Paradigm: The 
Effects of Inter- and Intragroup Interdependence’. PLOS ONE 11(11):e0165974.
Erikson, Erik H., and Joan M. Erikson. 1998. The Life Cycle Completed. Extended Version edition. 
New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Festinger, Leon. 1957. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Penguin Books.
Fraser, Nancy. 2000. ‘Rethinking Recognition’. New Left Review (3):107–20.
Freedomhouse. 2018. ‘Freedom on the Net 2018: The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism’. Retrieved 
13 March 2019 (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2018/rise-digital-
authoritarianism).
Freeman, Jo. 1973. ‘THE TYRANNY of STRUCTURELESSNESS’. Jo Freeman. Retrieved (https://
www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm).
Friesen, Norm. 2017. ‘Confessional Technologies of the Self: From Seneca to Social Media’. First 
Monday 22(6).
G. Lord, Charles, Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper. 1979. ‘Biased Assimilation and Attitude 
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence’. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 37(11):2098–2109.
41       Identity Politics in Syria: War in the digital space and the power of discursive practices
Geerse, M. T. 2011. ‘The Everyday Violence of Forced Displacement : Community, Memory and 
Identity Politics among Kurdish Internal Forced Migrants in Turkey’. Retrieved 11 February 2019 
(http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/191649).
Georgakopoulou, Alexandra. 2006. ‘Thinking Big with Small Stories in Narrative and Identity 
Analysis’. Narrative Inquiry 16(1):122–30.
Glendon, Mary Ann. 2008. Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse. Simon and 
Schuster.
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Reprint, 1989 edition. edited by Q. 
Hoare and G. N. Smith. New York: International Publishers Co.
Gramsci, Antonio. 1996. Prison Notebooks: Volume 2. edited by  translated by J. A. Buttigieg. 
Columbia University Press.
Gramsci, Antonio, Joseph A. Buttigieg, and Antonio Callari. 1992. Prison Notebooks.
Grayzel, Susan R. 2014. Women’s Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood, and Politics in Britain and 
France during the First World War. UNC Press Books.
Halbwachs, Maurice. 1992. On Collective Memory. University of Chicago Press.
HALL, EDWARD T. 1976. Beyond Culture. Anchor.
Herman, Edward S., and Noam Chomsky. 1998. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of 
the Mass Media. Vintage Publishing.
Higgins, E. Tory, and William S. Rholes. 1978. ‘“Saying Is Believing”: Effects of Message 
Modification on Memory and Liking for the Person Described’. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology 14(4):363–78.
Hintjens, Helen. 2008. ‘Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda’. Ethnicities 8(1):5–41.
Hobsbawm, Eric. 1996. ‘IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE LEFT’. New Left Review (217).
Holmes, Janet. 1986. ‘Functions of You Know in Women’s and Men’s Speech’. Language in Society 
15(1):1–21.
Holtgraves, Thomas M., and Paul J. Taylor. 2014. ‘The Role of Language in Conflict and Conflict 
Resolution’. in The Oxford Handbook of Language and Social Psychology, edited by T. M. Holtgraves. 
Oxford University Press.
honorshame. 2015. ‘The 5 Types of Honor-Shame Cultures’. HonorShame. Retrieved 9 February 
2019 (http://honorshame.com/types-honor-shame-cultures/).
Howarth, David, ed. 2014. Ernesto Laclau Post-Marxism, Populism and Critique. London: Routledge.
Hraba, Joseph, and Geoffrey Grant. 1970. ‘Black Is Beautiful: A Reexamination of Racial Preference 
and Identification.’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 16(3):398.
Jenkins, Richard. 2008. Social Identity. 3rd ed. London ; New York: Routledge.
Jost, John T. 2013. ‘Outgroup Favoritism and the Theory of System Justification: A Paradigm for 
Investigating the Effects of Socioeconomic Success on Stereotype Content’.
Kahne, Joseph, and Benjamin Bowyer. 2018. ‘The Political Significance of Social Media Activity and 
Social Networks’. Political Communication (Journal Article).
Kay, Paul, and Willett Kempton. 1984. ‘What Is the Sapir‐Whorf Hypothesis?’ American 
Anthropologist 86(1):65–79.
42       Identity Politics in Syria: War in the digital space and the power of discursive practices
Kertzer, David I. 1987. ‘Social/Cultural Anthropology: Honor and Shame and the Unity of the 
Mediterranean. David D. Gilmore, Ed’. American Anthropologist 89(4):991–991.
Khosroshahi, Fatemeh. 1989. ‘Penguins Don’t Care, but Women Do: A Social Identity Analysis of a 
Whorfian Problem’. Language in Society 18(4):505–25.
Kiersons, Steven. 2014. ‘Burma Update: Genocide in the Age of the Internet and Social Media’.
Kosinski, Michal, Sandra C. Matz, Samuel D. Gosling, Vesselin Popov, and David Stillwell. 2016. 
‘Facebook as a Research Tool’. Https://Www.Apa.Org. Retrieved 4 July 2019 (https://www.apa.org/
monitor/2016/03/ce-corner).
Kuran, Timur. 1997. Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification. 
Harvard University Press.
Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. 2001. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics. Verso.
Landsberg, Alison. 2009. ‘Memory, Empathy, and the Politics of Identification’. International Journal 
of Politics, Culture, and Society IJPS 22(2):221–29.
Lefebvre, Henri, ,. 2000. Everyday Life in the Modern World. London: Athlone.
Lehti, Lotta, Johanna Isosävi, Veronika Laippala, and Matti Luotolahti. 2016. ‘Linguistic Analysis 
of Online Conflicts: A Case Study of Flaming in the Smokahontas Comment Thread on YouTube’. 
WiderScreen 1(2).
Levy, Liz. 2013. ‘An Examination of the Evidence on Sectarianism in Scotland: Justice Analytical 
Services’. Justice Analytical Services 45.
Lippmann, Walter. 1997. Public Opinion. Free Press.
Long, Priscilla. 2011. My Brain on My Mind. New Word City.
McKeon, Matthew. n.d. ‘Argument | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy’. Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. Retrieved 23 March 2019 (https://www.iep.utm.edu/argument/).
Meyer, Erin. 2014. The Culture Map : Decoding How People Think and Get Things Done in a Global 
World. PublicAffairs.
Mojaye, Eserinune Mccarty. 2014. ‘Language and Communication for Domestic Conflict Resolution 
in Nigeria’.
Moritz, Mark. 2008. ‘A Critical Examination of Honor Cultures and Herding Societies in Africa’. 
African Studies Review 51(2):99–117.
O’Neill, Brendan. 2018. ‘The Hate at the Heart of Identity Politics’. Spiked-Online.
Poole, Steven. 2013a. ‘WMDs, “unconventional” Weapons and the Language of War’. The Guardian, 
September 4.
Poole, Steven. 2013b. ‘WMDs, “unconventional” Weapons and the Language of War’. The Guardian, 
September 4.
Rasool, Rayees. 2018. ‘Violence against Women as War Weapon | Breaking News Kashmir’. The 
Kashmir Walla. Retrieved 9 February 2019 (https://thekashmirwalla.com/2018/05/violence-
against-women-as-war-weapon/).
Reuland, Eric. 2017. ‘Language and Imagination: Evolutionary Explorations’. Neuroscience & 
Biobehavioral Reviews 81(Part B):255–78.
Roberts, Neil. 2014. Narrative and Voice in Postwar Poetry. Routledge.
43       Identity Politics in Syria: War in the digital space and the power of discursive practices
Römmele, Andrea. 2018. ‘How Is the Digital Age Changing Democracy as We Know It?’ Hertie 
School of Governance. Retrieved 8 February 2019 (https://www.hertie-school.org/en/debate/2018/
digitaldemocracyworkshop/).
Rosenberg, Morris, and Leonard I. Pearlin. 1978. ‘Social Class and Self-Esteem Among Children 
and Adults’. American Journal of Sociology 84(1):53–77.
Rouxpetel, Camille. n.d. ‘Building Confessional Identities in the Ottoman Empire (16th-18th 
centuries)’. Retrieved 15 October 2019 (https://normesrel.hypotheses.org/10).
Ruiz Ruiz, J. 2009. ‘Sociological Discourse Analysis: Methods and Logic’. Forum Qualitative 
Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research 10(2).
Ryan, William. 2010. Blaming the Victim. revised. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.
Rychard, Sandra, and Simon Mason. 2005. ‘Conflict Analyis Tools’. Retrieved (http://www.css.
ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Conflict-
Analysis-Tools.pdf).
Sáez-Mateu, Ferran. 2018. ‘Democracy, Screens, Identity, and Social Networks: The Case of Donald 
Trump’s Election’. American Behavioral Scientist 62(3):320–34.
Siegel, Alexandra, and Alexandra Siegel. 2015. ‘Sectarian Twitter Wars: Sunni-Shia Conflict and 
Cooperation in the Digital Age’. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 31 August 
2019 (https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/12/20/sectarian-twitter-wars-sunni-shia-conflict-and-
cooperation-in-digital-age-pub-62299).
Smith, Dan. 1997. ‘Language and Discourse in Conflict and Conflict Resolution’. Current Issues In 
Language and Society 4(3):190–214.
Snyder, M., and N. Cantor. 1979. ‘Testing Hypotheses about Other People: The Use of Historical 
Knowledge’. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 15:330–42.
Spina, Stefania. 2018. ‘Role of Emoticons as Structural Markers in Twitter Interactions’. Discourse 
Processes (Journal Article):1–18.
Suurmond, Jeannine M. 2005. Our Talk and Walk: Discourse Analysis and Conflict Studies. 
Clingendael Institute.
Swing, Berna Gercek. 2012. ‘Honor and Shame in Honor and Dignity Cultures: How Can You Re-
Affirm Your Own Honor Once It Is Tarnished?’ 128.
Szkudlarek, Tomasz. 2011. ‘Semiotics of Identity: Politics and Education.’ Studies in Philosophy and 
Education 30(2):113–25.
Tajfel, Henri. 1974. ‘Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour’. Retrieved 24 January 2019 (https://
journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/053901847401300204?journalCode=ssia).
Tajfel, Henri, and A. L. Wilkes. 1963. ‘Classification and Quantitative Judgement’. British Journal of 
Psychology 54(2):101–14.
Van Dijk, Teun A. 2006. ‘Ideology and Discourse Analysis’. Journal of Political Ideologies 11(2):115–
40.
Vasilyeva, Alena L. 2016. ‘Interpersonal-Communication and Language-and-Social-Interaction 
Approaches to Studying Conflict’. TIPA. Travaux Interdisciplinaires Sur La Parole et Le Langage (32).
Wodak, Ruth. 2010. ‘The Discursive Construction of History. Brief Considerations.’ Mots 94(Journal, 
Electronic):19 October 2018.
44       Identity Politics in Syria: War in the digital space and the power of discursive practices
Wodak, Ruth, Rudolf De Cillia, Martin Reisigl, Karin Liebhart, Angelika Hirsch, Richard Mitten, and 
J. W. Unger. 2009. ‘The Discursive Construction of National Identity.’ Pp. 7–48 in The Discursive 
Construction of National Identity. Edinburgh University Press.
Wodak, Ruth, and Michael Meyer. 2015. Methods of Critical Discourse Studies. SAGE.
Wodak, Ruth, and John Richardson. 2009. ‘On the Politics of Remembering (or Not)’. Critical 
Discourse Studies 6(4):231–35.
work(s):, Raymond Cohen Reviewed. 2001. ‘Language and Conflict Resolution: The Limits of 
English’. International Studies Review 3(1):25–51.
Wright, Sue. 1997. ‘Language as a Contributing Factor in Conflicts Between States and Within 
States’. Current Issues In Language and Society 4(3):215–37.
Young, James E. 1992. ‘The Counter-Monument: Memory against Itself in Germany Today’. The 
University of Chicago Press 18(2):267–96.
Young, James E. 1994. The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning. Yale University 
Press; Revised ed. edition.
Young, Stacey. 1997. ‘Dichotomies and Displacement: Bisexuality in Queer Theory and Politics’. Pp. 
55–56 in Playing with Fire: Queer Politics, Queer Theories, edited by S. Phelan. Routledge.
9 Appendices
For the full list of appendices, please visit this link.
45       Identity Politics in Syria: War in the digital space and the power of discursive practices
Find out more about the  
Department of International 
Development
Connaught House, London School of 
Economics, Houghton Street, London, 
WC2A 2AE
Telephone 
Wendy Foulds, Programme Manager, 
+44(
lse.ac.uk/conflict
The London School of Economics and Political Science is a School of the University of 
London. It is a charity and is incorporated in England as a company limited by guarantee  
under the Companies Acts (Reg no 70527).
The School seeks to ensure that people are treated equitably, regardless of age, disability, race, 
nationality, ethnic or national origin, gender, religion, sexual  
orientation or personal circumstances.
 
Photography: John Wreford from Damascus, Syria 18th September 2011 “Two Syrian girls 
walking past an internet cafe on the Street Called Straight”. Source: Shutterstock.
Disclaimer: This material has been funded by UK aid from the UK government; however the 
views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.
Please note that the information provided is accurate at the time of writing but is subject to 
change.
Find out more about the Conflict 
Research Programme
Connaught House 
The London School of Economics and 
Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE
Contact: 
Amy Crinnion, Programme Manager
Tel: +44	(0)20	7849	4631 
Email: Ideas.Crp@lse.ac.uk
Supported by
